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discusses various medical misconceptions about the treatment of pain and how modern medicine fails to
fulfill this aspect of its palliative care role. Part III reviews how the law currently circumscribes the patient and
doctor's ability to make medical decisions when the patient is terminally ill. As will be shown, the law is
clearer and more respectful of good medical practice than most medical practitioners currently believe.
Moreover, this section will also establish that, while several competing philosophical positions surrounding
physician-assisted suicide exist, these same philosophies harmoniously approve of aggressive pain treatment.
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end of life, regarding palliative care to relieve pain and suffering. It will in no way exhaust the subject of end-of-
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humanity? It remains that we retard what we cannot repel, that 
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- Samuel Johnson l 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The subject of physician-assisted suicide has inundated Amer-
ica's culture over the course of the last decade. For the last seven 
years, Dr. Jack Kevorkian, the notorious pathologist from Michi-
gan, has defied the American legal system to find him guilty of a 
crime.2 With his assistance, at least forty-five people have ended 
their lives. 3 Nonetheless, three juries have acquitted him of statu-
tory and common-law versions of the crime of assisting suicide.
4 
While Michigan authorities have apparently surrendered in their 
attempt to circumscribe his death-inducing activities,; Dr. Kev-
orkian continues to make regular public appearances in which he 
describes exactly what he has done and why he believes his acts are 
justifiable. 6 Moreover, he continues to declare adamantly that he 
will continue helping virtual strangers end their lives.7 
While Dr. Kevorkian persists in his practices, the public clamor 
for the legalization of physician-assisted suicide has intensified. 
Surveys reveal that up to two-thirds of Americans support some 
form of medical assistance to hasten the death of the terminally ill. 8 
2. See Prosecutor Drops Charges Against Kevorkian, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 1997, at 
News 11 (reporting that the prosecutor dropped the charges against Dr. Kev-
orkian in ten assisted suicides because "it would be a waste of time and taxpayer 
money to pursue him"). 
3. See id. 
4. See id. 
5. See Charges Dropped Against Kevorkian: New Prosecutor Says Cases Couldn't Be 
Won, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1997, at News 1 (indicating that the prosecutor believed 
the charges could not be successfully prosecuted and that the likely effect could 
actually be counterproductive by enhancing Dr. Kevorkian's crusade). 
6. See, e.g., Brian Harmon, The Many Faces of Jack Kevorkian, DET. NEWS, Feb. 
23, 1997, at Al (detailing a conversation with Dr. Kevorkian in which he relates 
his views on physician-assisted suicide). 
7. See id. 
8. See, e.g., Jerald G. Bachman et al., Attitudes of Michigan Physicians and the 
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In addition, some studies reveal that more than half of the nation's 
doctors support physician-assisted suicide,9 despite the fact that 
numerous professional organizations do not condone the prac-
tice. 10 The appearance of electoral proposals further evidences the 
strength of current public opinion. While previous measures in 
two states narrowly failed,11 in 1994, Oregon voters passed the 
Public Toward Legalizing Physician-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia, 334 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 303, 306-07 (1996) (sUIveying and comparing the attitudes of Michi-
gan physicians and the general adult population toward legalizing physician-
assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia); Robert J. Blendon et aI., Should Physi-
cians Aid Their Patients in Dying? The Public Perspective, 267 JAMA 2658, 2659 (1992) 
(examining the public's interest in and support of physician-assisted suicide, 
euthanasia, and right-to-die legislation by reviewing surveys conducted between 
1950 and 1991). 
However, a recent poll produced more complicated results. Forty percent 
of the respondents did not know that it was legal to give patients pain medication 
that might hasten death, and 35% were unfamiliar with the terms "hospice" and 
"palliative care." Mter these terms were explained, 73% said they would choose 
hospice care, palliative care, or natural death if terminally ill, 14% were unde-
cided, and only 13% said they would still choose physician-assisted suicide. See 
AMA Poll: The More Patients Know, the Less They Want Suicide Aid, AM. MED. NEWS, 
Jan. 13, 1997, at 3. 
9. See Melinda A. Lee et aI., Legalizing Assisted Suicide - Views of Physicians in 
Oregon, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 310, 310 (1996) (noting that studies show that be-
tween 31 % and 54% of United States physicians do not oppose legalizing physi-
cian-assisted suicide or euthanasia). 
10. See, e.g., Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Asso-
ciation, Decisions Near the End of Life, 267 JAMA 2229, 2233 (1992) (concluding 
that physicians should not assist patients with suicide until the issue has been 
more thoroughly examined); Nessa Coyle, The Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted 
Suicide Debate: Issues for Nursing, 19 ONCOLOGY NURSING F. 41, 44 (1992) (stating 
that the American Nurses Association takes the position that it is against the ethi-
cal tradition of nursing to help patients end their lives). 
The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs states that although "in highly 
sympathetic cases physician-assisted suicide may seem to constitute beneficent 
care, due to the potential for grave harm the medical profession cannot condone 
physician-assisted suicide at this time." Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, 
supra, at 2233. Instead, the Council directs the medical profession to strive to 
identify the concerns behind patients' requests for assisted suicide and to find 
ways other than assisted suicide to address these concerns, such as providing more 
aggressive comfort care. See id. 
The American Medical Association reaffirmed its position when it formed a 
coalition to ask the U.S. Supreme Court not to legalize the practice when ruling 
upon the physician-assisted suicide cases argued recently before it. See AMA Poll: 
The More Patients Know, supra note 8, at 3. 
11. See Death with Dignity Act, 1992 Cal. Legis. Servo Prop. 161 (West) (re-
jected by the voters Nov. 3, 1992); Death with Dignity Act, 1991 Wash. Legis. Servo 
Init. Meas. 119 (West) (rejected by the people Nov. 5, 1991); see also Bachman et 
aI., supra note 8, at 303 (noting the defects of the Washington and California ini-
tiatives and discussing the Oregon initiative); William Carlsen, When Patients 
Choose to Die, S.F. CHRON., June 3, 1996, at Al (noting that the California proposi-
HeinOnline -- 23 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 328 1997
328 WIllIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23 
Death with Dignity Act,12 the nation's first statute permitting doc-
tors to prescribe lethal medications to allow terminally ill patients 
to kill themselves. IS Other states have considered legislation legal-
izing physician-assisted suicide, but, as yet, no statutes have been 
d 14 passe. 
More recently, the push for the legalization of physician-
assisted suicide entered the courthouse. In January 1997, the 
United States Supreme Court heard arguments regarding the con-
stitutionality of statutes from New Yorkl5 and Washington l6 that 
prohibit anyone from assisting another in committing suicide. 17 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that New York's bar 
against physician-assisted suicide is an unconstitutional infringe-
ment of the Equal Protection Clause. 18 The Ninth Circuit took a 
tion was defeated 52% to 48% while Washington voters rejected that measure 
53.5% to 46.5%); cf. Annette E. Clark, Autonomy and Death, 71 TuL. L. REv. 45, 56 
(1996) (stating that both initiatives were defeated by identical 54% to 46% mar-
gins). 
12. See OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.800-.897 (1996) (passed by voters in a general 
election on Nov. 8,1994). Oregon voters approved the measure by the narrowest 
of margins, 51 % to 49%. See Clark, supra note 11, at 58 n.40. 
At the time of this writing, several bills are before the Oregon legislature to 
amend or repeal the statute. One bill proposes the addition of provisions that 
provide physicians with immunity from civil and criminal liability and professional 
discipline for good-faith compliance with Oregon's Death with Dignity Act. See 
H.B. 3362, 69th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Or.). Another bill expands the scope of 
the required counseling for patients who request physician-assisted suicide. See 
H.B. 2965, 69th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Or.). A third repeals the Death with Dig-
nity Act. See H.B. 2700, 69th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Dr.). 
13. See OR. REv. STAT. § 127.885 (1995); see also Lee v. Oregon, Nos. 95-
35804, 95-35948, 95-35805, 95-35949, 95-35854, 1997 WL 80783, at *1 (9th Cir. 
Feb. 27, 1997) (dismissing a lawsuit challenging Oregon's Death with Dignity 
Act). 
14. In 1992 alone, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, and New Hampshire introduced 
bills legalizing physician-assisted suicide. In 1994, New York introduced legisla-
tion that would legalize physician-assisted suicide for mentally competent, termi-
nally ill adults. However, in 1996, an overwhelming majority of the New Hamp-
shire House rejected that bill. See Clark, supra note 11, at 55-56 nn.27-28. 
15. See N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 120.30, 125.15(3) (McKinney 1987) (declaring a 
person guilty of a felony for promoting a suicide attempt; declaring a person 
guilty of manslaughter in the second degree for intentionally causing or aiding 
another person to commit suicide). 
16. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988) (designating it a fel-
ony to promote a suicide attempt by knowingly causing or aiding another person 
to attempt suicide). 
17. See Justices Question Argument for Suicide: Court Begins Review of Assisted 
Death Issue, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 8,1997, at News 1 [hereinafter Court Begins Review of 
Assisted Death Issue]. 
18. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 731 (2d Cir.), cm. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 
(1996). 
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different route to reach the same result. 19 It concluded that the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment renders Wash-
ington's statute unconstitutional, because it impermissibly prohib-
its doctors from prescribing potentially lethal medications to com-
petent, terminally ill patients who wish to end their lives.20 A 
decision from the high court is expected during the summer of 
1997.21 
Underlying much of the discussion about physician-assisted 
suicide is the public's fear of undergoing a prolonged and painful 
demise.22 Advocates of physician-assisted death have focused on 
this fear, rather than dealing with the most critical component of 
this issue: the ability of medicine to treat pain. The current debate 
has incorrectly centered on the perception of a painful death 
rather than how medical practitioners carry out their role of allevi-
ating pain. Yet it is clear that fears about inadequate pain control, 
which drive the physician-assisted suicide debate, are at the heart of 
the issue. Patients whose pain is adequately controlled rarely want 
assisted suicide. In a recent study, seventy-three percent of per-
sons, when they understood what "palliative care" and "hospice" 
meant, said they would choose those options over physician-assisted 
suicide.23 By refocusing attention on how medicine addresses the 
problem, rather than the problem itself, the public's motivation for 
favoring physician-assisted suicide seemingly dissipates. 
Shifting attention to how medicine addresses pain, though, re-
veals an entirely separate set of difficulties. As many have observed, 
no physician in the United States has ever been convicted of mur-
der or assisted suicide for providing a patient with high doses of 
medication for pain relieC4 Despite this, a recent study revealed 
19. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.) , stay 
granted by Washington v. Glucksberg, 116 S. Ct. 2494, cen. granted, 117 S. Ct. 37 
(1996). 
20. See id. at 838. 
21. See Courl Begins Review of Assisted Death Issue, supra note 17, at News 1. 
22. See Melissa L. Buchan, M.D., & Susan W. Tolle, M.D., Pain Relief for Dying 
Persons: Dealing with Physicians' Fears and Concerns, 6 J. CUNICAL ETHICS 53, 53 
(1995) (stating that in developed countries 50% to 80% of patients do not receive 
adequate pain relief); Sidney H. Wanzer, M.D., et aI., The Physician's Responsibility 
Toward Hopelessly III Patients: A Second Look, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 844, 847 (1989) 
[hereinafter Wanzer, A Second Look] (summarizing current practices affecting the 
care of dying patients). 
23. See AMA Poll: The More Patients Know, supra note 8, at 3. 
24. See, e.g., Buchan & Tolle, supra note 22, at 57 ("To our knowledge, no 
physician in the United States has ever been convicted of murder or assisted sui-
cide for providing a patient with appropriate high-dose pain medication."); Leon-
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that physicians consistently fail to treat pain adequately.25 The 
study, involving 687 physicians and 759 nurses in five hospitals, 
asked the health care providers to assess the care that dying pa-
tients received at the end of their lives. 26 Overall, eighty-one per-
cent of the participants reported that "the most common form of 
'narcotic abuse' in the care of the dying is undertreatment of 
pain.,,27 Just over one-third of the physicians and forty-four percent 
of the nurses expressed the view that under-medication is most of-
ten due to the "fear of hastening a patient's death" or, in other 
words, of providing a last, lethal dose.28 Thus, the fact that modern 
medicine fails adequately to address patient pain certainly lends 
credence to the public's fear of a horrible end. 
Minnesota's experiences further detail this disturbing trend. 
Two investigations of several physicians and their palliative care of 
two dying patients occurred in Hennepin County, Minnesota, in 
1989.29 While these cases never proceeded beyond the investiga-
tion stage,30 they caused considerable distress in the local medical 
community.31 More importantly, they reveal the fears physicians 
face when they attempt to provide appropriate pain relief to dying 
. 32 patIents. 
This Article addresses some of the issues that these cases raise. 
Part II discusses various medical misconceptions about the treat-
ard H. Glantz, Withholding and Withdrawing Treatment: The Role of the Criminal Law, 
15 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 231,238-40 (1987); Sidney H. Wanzer, M.D., et aI., 
The Physician's Responsibility to Hopelessly III Patients, 310 NEW ENG.]. MED. 955, 956 
(1984) [hereinafter Wanzer, Physician's Responsibility] (noting that criminal 
charges against physicians who withdraw life support are rare); Thomas L. John-
son, "Good Death" Can Have a Bad Ending, HENNEPIN LAw., Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 11 
("[N]o physician ha[s] ever been successfully prosecuted anywhere in the United 
States for an act of either omission or commission that led to the death of a seri-
ously ill patient."). 
25. See Mildred Z. Solomon et aI., Decisions Near the End of Life: Professional 
Views on Life Sustaining Treatments, 83 AM.]. PUB. HEALTH 14, 19 (1993). 
26. See id. at 15. 
27. Id. 
28. !d. 
29. See Gordon Slovut, County Attorney Calls Deaths Homicide, But He Won't 
Prosecute, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 25, 1990, at lB. 
30. SeeJohnson, supra note 24, at 10. 
31. See Michele Cook & Walter Parker, Second Morphine Death Probed: St. Paul 
Man's Death in Hospital Ruled Homicide, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH, Aug. 30, 
1989, at lA (quoting Dr. Ronald Cranford, a neurologist and medical ethicist at 
Hennepin County Medical Center, as saying "the potential for criminal indict-
ments would have an extremely deleterious effect. It would discourage what we 
are trying to encourage"). 
32. See id. 
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ment of pain and how modern medicine fails to fulfill this aspect of 
its palliative care role. Part III reviews how the law currently cir-
cumscribes the patient and doctor's ability to make medical deci-
sions when the patient is terminally ill. As will be shown, the law is 
clearer and more respectful of good medical practice than most 
medical practitioners currently believe. Moreover, this section will 
also establish that, while several competing philosophical positions 
surrounding physician-assisted suicide exist, these same philoso-
phies harmoniously approve of aggressive pain treatment. 
Part IV examines the role of the criminal law in medical 
treatment decisions, particularly those made at the end of life, re-
garding palliative care to relieve pain and suffering. It will in no 
way exhaust the subject of end-of-life medical treatment, nor will it 
discuss every possible place at which the practice of medicine and 
the criminal law might cross paths. Rather, Part IV considers some 
of the most important points of intersection between the two, and 
attempts to clarifY the most significant principles of law and ethics 
that apply when the criminal law seeks to scrutinize medical deci-
sions about palliative care to dying persons. It then should be ap-
parent that the rush to legalize assisted suicide is misdirected and 
diversionary. 
II. MEDICAL MISCONCEPTIONS AND THE FAILURE OF MODERN 
MEDICINE TO TREAT PAIN 
For many, the prospect of legal access to a physician's help in 
bringing about a swift end to a long and painful dying process is a 
welcome blessing. The thought of dependence, indignity and, 
worst of all, unremitting suffering at the end of life is an unimagin-
able horror. 33 For some doctors, the most difficult aspect of caring 
for such patients is the knowledge that at some point they may have 
to say no to a patient's plea for a swift and easy death,:l4 or risk pro-
fessional sanctions and perhaps criminal prosecution for acceding 
33. See George C. Garbesi, The Law of Assisted Suicide, 3 ISSUES L. & MED. 93, 
104 (1989) (noting that the pain and suffering associated with terminal illness 
leaves some "unable to derive even minimal pleasure from their existence"). 
34. See Wanzer, Physician's Responsibility, supra note 24, at 956 (noting that a 
"physician's schooling, residency training, and professional oath emphasize posi-
tive actions to sustain and prolong life"); Julia Pugliese, Note, Don't Ask - Don't 
Tell: The Secret Practice of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 44 HAsTINGS LJ. 1291, 1300, 1306 
(1993) (stating that doctors face a difficult quandary: assisting suicide is illegal, yet 
refusing to assist is contrary to medical ethics). 
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to the desperate request.S5 Many physicians, in addition to wanting 
to avoid this issue, find the public's growing demand for physician 
aid in dying as posing the gravest of risks to the integrity of the 
medical profession and to the relationship between the doctor and 
the dying patient.S6 
A. Inadequate Access to Palliative Care and Lack of Proper Physician 
Training 
Palliative care refers to the care of terminally ill patients near 
the end of their lives.s7 The primary goal of this type of care is to 
alleviate pain, rather than to prolong life.!l8 During the latter part 
of this century, palliative medicine finally has been endorsed as a 
critical part of any rational health care policy. 39 An outgrowth of 
this evolution in medicine has been the advent of hospice care, 
which has flourished in the United States.40 Hospice care has stead-
ily become a favored way of treating the terminally ill since such fa-
cilities specialize in all aspects of palliative care,41 with the goal of 
35. See Buchan & Tolle, supra note 22, at 53-54; Pugliese, supra note 34, at 
1291-92 (narrating the story of one doctor who assisted a terminally ill patient in 
ending his life and later lied about and covered up his actions to avoid possible 
negative repercussions). 
36. See Pugliese, supra note 34, at 1315-16 (stating that some doctors fear 
their role will be seen, at least in the eyes of some potential patients, as that of a 
killer rather than a healer). 
37. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1284 (26th ed. 1995) (defining "pal-
liative") . 
38. See id. "Palliative therapy is treatment undertaken with the objective of 
relieving symptoms, particularly when these are painful, or in some other way dis-
tressing, but in the knowledge that it will not affect the outcome of the disease." 
THE OXFORD MEDICAL COMPANION 722 Uohn Walton et al. eds., 1994). 
39. See Christine K Cassel, M.D., & Bruce C. Vladeck, M.D., ICD-9 Code fM 
Palliative M Terminal Care, 335 NEW ENG.]. MED. 1232, 1232 (1996). 
40. See id.; Wanzer, A Second Look, supra note 22, at 845; Walter Parker, Medi-
cine, Law Clash over Mmphine, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH, Oct. 2, 1989, at 
1A. 
41. Webster's defines hospice as "a home like facility to provide supportive 
care for terminally ill patients." WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 879 (2d ed. 
1983). Hospice care in this country follows the principles of its English origina-
tor, Dame Cicely Saunders, founder of London's St. Christopher's Hospice. See 
Ronald Melzack, T~ Tragedy of Needless Pain, SCI. AM., Feb. 1990, at 27, 28. The 
richness of hospice care, as Dr. Saunders envisioned and practiced it, cannot be 
adequately described here. The control of physical pain, our concern here, is but 
one part of this extraordinary form of treatment. For a detailed description of 
how the hospice program works and how patients have become part of the 
movement to help others, see generally SANDOL STODDARD, THE HOSPICE 
MOVEMENT: A BETfER WAY OF CARING FOR THE DYING (1978). 
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preserving and enhancing the quality of life for those who are near 
its end.42 Excellent pain relief is its hallmark.45 Still, hospices in the 
United States presently serve only a disappointing seventeen per-
cent of all dying patients.44 The primary reason for this is that 
home care is an integral, often required, component of most hos-
pice plans.45 As a result, hospice care usually is inaccessible to those 
patients without family members who can provide twenty-four-hour 
support. 46 Since nearly eighty percent of Americans die in either 
hospitals or nursing homes,47 the vast majority of dying patients are 
subject to the most uneven quality in palliative care.48 
Palliative care has struggled to take root in the United States 
for reasons other than lack of access to hospice care. The failure of 
medical schools properly to train students how to manage pain ef-
fectively exacerbates the problem. Most medical students are of-
fered only a short elective course in palliative care in their last year 
of school, and few choose it.49 Residents in a majority of hospitals 
receive little training and experience in how to care for the termi-
nally ill.50 Moreover, studies reveal that health care professionals' 
42. See Melzack, supra note 41, at 28. 
43. See id. 
44. See Cassel & Vladeck, supra note 39, at 1232. 
45. See id. 
46. See id. 
47. See id. (noting that 17% of Americans die in nursing homes and 61 % die 
in hospitals). 
48. See id. at 1232-33. The care of dying patients in America varies greatly 
among hospitals. According to one study, 
half the physicians did not respect or know about patients' advance di-
rectives, the majority of do-not-resuscitate orders were not instituted un-
til 24 hours before the patients' death, and most soberingly, 40[%] of 
patients had severe and potentially treatable pain for more than several 
days before they died. 
Id. (citing The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial to Improve Care 
for Seriously Ia Hospitalized Patients, 274JAMA 1591 (1995». 
49. See id. at 1232. The American Medical Association's report on medical 
education states that only five of 126 medical schools in the country require a 
separate course in care of the dying. See T. Patrick Hill, Treating the Dying Patient: 
The Challenge for Medical Education, 155 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1265, 1265 
(1995). 
50. See Hill, supra note 49, at 1265. Of 7048 residency programs, only 26% 
offer a course on the medical and legal aspects of care at the end of life as a regu-
lar part of the curriculum. See id; see also Kathleen M. Foley, M.D., Competent Care 
for the Dying Instead of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 54, 55-56 
(1997) [hereinafter Foley, Competent Care] ("According to a survey of 1068 accred-
ited residency programs in family medicine, internal medicine, and pediatrics and 
fellowship programs in geriatrics, each resident or fellow coordinates the care of 
10 or fewer dying patients annually."). 
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knowledge of the science of pharmacology and the management of 
pain control is sorely deficient in the United States. 51 This remains 
true despite the fact that in recent years, proponents of palliative 
medicine have developed helpful guidelines for the aggressive 
management of intractable symptoms in dying patients. 52 Not only 
do these guidelines recommend dosages of opioids and other 
drugs to manage pain, they also approve sedation for patients 
whose pain cannot be controlled effectively. 53 
Many explanations have been offered for our fixation on phy-
sician-assisted suicide as the only solution to the problem of suffer-
ing at the end of life. All of them, however, seem to involve a rec-
ognition that humane, compassionate, and effective care for the 
dying, especially good pain relief, is provided only irregularly in 
this country.54 This remains true despite the fact that numerous 
professional organizations have stressed the critical importance of 
51. See Buchan & Tolle, supra note 22, at 57; I. G. Finlay, House Officers' Atti-
tudes Towards Terminal Care, 20 MED. EDUC. 507, 508-09 (1986); Foley, Competent 
Care, supra note 50, at 55-56; Lynette Smeder Fox, Pain Management in the Termi-
nally III Cancer Patient: An Investigation of Nurses' Attitudes, Knowledge and Clinical 
Practice, 147 MIL. MED. 455, 456 (1982); Solomon et aI., supra note 25, at 20-21; 
Jamie H. Von Roenn, M.D., et aI., Physician Attitudes and Practice in Cancer Pain 
Management: A Survey from the Eastern Cooperative Oncology Group, 119 ANNALS 
INTERNALMED. 121, 125-26 (1993). 
52. See, e.g., Nathan I. Cherny et aI., Guidelines in the Care of the Dying Patient, 
10 HEMATOLOGY/ONCOLOGY CLINICS N. AM. 261, 263, 265-67 (1996) [hereinafter 
Cherny, Guidelines in the Care of the Dying Patient] (describing the features essential 
to the care of dying patients as clinical competence, compassion, comfort, com-
munication, visits from children, family cohesion and integration, cheerfulness, 
consistency and perseverance, and equanimity); Nathan I. Cherny & Rusell K. 
Portenoy, Sedation in the Management of Refractory Symptoms: Guidelines for Evaluation 
and Treatment, 10 J. PALLIATIVE CARE 31, 32-33 (1994); Robert D. Truog, M.D., et 
aI., Barbiturates in the Care of the Terminally Il~ 327 NEW ENG. J. MED .. 1678, 1681 
(1992) (describing the potential utility of barbiturates for terminal anguish). 
53. See Cherny, Guidelines in the Care of the Dying Patient, supra note 52, at 265 
(stating that adequate relief of physical and psychological pain in terminally ill 
patients can be accomplished through comprehensive care); Cherny & Portenoy, 
supra note 52, at 35 (recommending alternatives to opioids to sedate patients with 
refractory pain); Truog, supra note 52, at 1681. 
54. See Jo Ann Dalton, Nurses' Perceptions of Their Pain Assessment Skills, Pain 
Management Practices, and Attitudes Toward Pain, 16 ONCOLOGY NURSING F. 225, 225-
26 (1989); Karin L. Dorrepaal et aI., Pain Experience and Pain Management Among 
Hospitalized Cancer Patients, 63 CANCER 593, 594 (1989); Kathleen M. Foley, The 
Treatment of Cancer Pain, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 84, 87 (1985) [hereinafter Foley, 
Treatment of Cancer Pain]; William T. McGiveney & Glenna M. Crooks, The Care of 
Patients with Severe Chronic Pain in Terminal Illness, 251 JAMA 1182, 1182 (1984); 
Solomon et aI., supra note 25, at 20; Wanzer, Physician's Responsibility, supra note 
24, at 956; Melzack, supra note 41, at 27. 
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good pain control for dying patients, even when the drugs given 
may incidentally shorten life.55 
B. Medical Misconceptions Regarding the Use of Drugs to Treat the 
Terminally III 
In addition to the inadequate access to hospice care and train-
ing of medical practitioners, other hurdles prevent patients from 
receiving aggressive pain treatment. A common obstacle to zealous 
pain relief for dying patients has been the collective misunder-
standing by patients and physicians of the process by which patients 
may develop tolerance to morphine and other opioids.56 Physicians 
and patients alike often have unfounded concerns about addiction, 
and they erroneously equate the normal development of tolerance 
to opioids with addiction.57 As research shows, these fears are un-
substantiated. 
Numerous studies have shown addiction to be extremely rare 
in patients who had not previously shown such tendencies. 58 Clini-
cal observation of patterns of opioid use instead have revealed that 
many patients maintain stable doses of opioids for long periods of 
time without requiring a dose escalation or reduction. 59 While the 
majority of patients may be managed within a fairly standard range 
of dosage,60 some patients require and tolerate increasingly high 
55. See, e.g., AMERICAN NURSING AssOCIATION, PosmON STATEMENT ON 
PROMOTION OF COMFORT AND RELIEF OF PAIN IN DYING PATIENTS 1 (1995) (promot-
ing the belief of the American Nurses Association that nurses are obligated to use 
aggressive efforts to relieve pain and other symptoms of dying patients); American 
College of Physicians, American College of Physicians Ethics Manual Third Edition, 117 
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 947, 955 (1992) (stressing that physicians should make 
the relief of pain in dying patients their number one objective, "even if a side ef-
fect is to shorten life"). 
56. See C. Brian Tuttle, Drug Management of Pain in Cancer Patients, 132 CAN. 
MED. Assoc.]. 121, 132 (1985). Morphine is a central nervous system depressant 
derived from opium poppies. See PDR GENERICS 1974-75 (1st ed. 1995). It is fre-
quently prescribed for "the relief of severe acute and severe chronic pain." [d. at 
1976. When used incorrectly, morphine can lead to serious side effects, such as 
respiratory depression, systemic failure of the nervous system, coma, and death. 
See id. at 1980. 
57. See Tuttle, supra note 56, at 132. 
58. See Kathleen M. Foley, M.D., The Relationship of Pain and Symptom Man-
agement to Patient Requests for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 6 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 
289,291 (1991); Tuttle, supra note 56, at 132; Kathleen M. Foley, M.D., Controlling 
the Pain of Cancer, SCI. AM., Sept. 1996, at 165 [hereinafter Foley, Controlling Pain]. 
59. See Tuttle, supra note 56, at 132. 
60. See id. 
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doses of morphine and other opioids,61 but they still can obtain 
good pain relief without undesirable side effects.62 It is critical to 
understand that tolerance has no upper limit. 63 In patients who 
develop tolerance to these drugs, the medication must be with-
drawn slowly, as the need for pain relief diminishes, to prevent 
withdrawal symptoms.64 This physiological tolerance, however, is 
not "addfction. ,,65 True addiction is the psychological condition 
"characterized by constant craving and compulsive drug-seeking 
behavior,,,66and it rarely occurs in these situations.67 
Respiratory depression appears to be another greatly over-
stated risk of morphine use in dying patients. 66 Considerable evi-
dence indicates that pain and other discomfort serves to counteract 
any depressive effects of the drug. 69 Risk obviously is involved in 
suddenly and sharply elevating any patient's morphine dosage, just 
as it is risky to give large doses to an "opiate naive" patient.70 Hos-
pice care has demonstrated, however, that if administration of the 
drug is begun earlier in the course of the patient's disease, in doses 
just large enough to control pain, the patient's quality of life may 
be greatly improved, even as the patient's morphine requirements 
increase with the progression of disease.71 
Authorities on palliative care for the terminally ill have identi-
fied additional explanations for why physicians fail competently to 
61. See id. 
62. See id. See generally Shirley L. Lo & Robert R. Coleman, Exceptionally High 
Narcotic Analgesic Requirements in a Terminally III Cancer Patient, 5 CUNICAL 
PHARMACY 828 (1986) (describing a terminally ill patient who required high doses 
of narcotics to control pain and overcome tolerance). 
63. See Kathleen M. Foley, M.D., Misconceptions and Controversies Regarding the 
Use of Opioids in Cancer Pain, 6 ANn-CANCER DRUGS 308, 314 (1995) [hereinafter 
Foley, Misconceptions and Controversies]. 
64. See Tuttle, supra note 56, at 132. 
65. See Foley, Treatment of Cancer Pain, supra note 54, at 88; Tuttle, supra note 
56, at 132. 
66. Foley, Controlling Pain, supra note 58, at 165. 
67. See Tuttle, supra note 56, at 132. 
68. See Steton Grond, M.D., et ai., Validation of World Health Organization 
Guidelines for Cancer Pain Relief During the Last Days and Hours of Life, 6 J. PAIN & 
SYMPTOM MGMT. 411, 419 (1991). 
69. See, e.g., Foley, Treatment of Cancer Pain, supra note 54, at 84 (discussing 
how to treat the severe pain associated with incurable cancer); Lo & Coleman, 
supra note 62, at 828 (tracking the progress of a terminally ill cancer patient who 
was given exceptionally high doses of narcotic analgesics to control chronic, se-
vere pain and to overcome tolerance). 
70. See Tuttle, supra note 56, at 132. 
71. See id. 
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utilize morphine and other analgesic drugs to relieve pain. Kath-
leen M. Foley, M.D., chief of the pain service in the department of 
neurology at Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New York 
City, has written several articles about the need to dispel the myths 
and to deal with the lack of knowledge that result in the under-
treatment of pain in the dying patient.72 She attributes this under-
treatment to a number of factors. 73 She relies on numerous studies 
that "demonstrate a significant lack of knowledge in both the theo-
retical and practical understanding of analgesic drug therapy in 
both acute pain and cancer pain management. ,,74 She cites poor 
communication between doctors and patients about pain assess-
ment as another significant barrier to adequate treatment.75 She 
also notes that the increase worldwide in the availability of mor-
phine and other opioids has raised unsubstantiated fears that the 
drugs will be diverted to the illicit market.76 In many instances, 
however, it is not just the lack of experience and knowledge that 
impedes the provision of good palliative care at the end of life, but 
also physicians' fears of legal liability and professional sanctions for 
causing or hastening death.77 
III. THE LAw AND ETHICS OF TREATING THE TERMINALLY ILL 
A. Explicating Terminology to Define the Scope of the Problem 
Initially, some language must be clarified. Much diverting and 
inflammatory discussion of this subject already has resulted from 
the inteIjection of terminology that is used improperly or defined 
72. See, e.g., Foley, Misconceptions and Controversies, supra note 63, at 308; 
Kathleen M. Foley, M.D., Pain Relief into Practice: Rhetoric Without Reform, 13 J. 
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2149,2156 (1995) [hereinafter Foley, Pain Relief]; Foley, Con-
trolling Pain, supra note 58, at 164. 
73. See Foley, Misconceptions and Controversies, supra note 63, at 308. 
74. Foley, Pain Relief, supra note 72, at 2149. 
75. See Foley, Misconceptions and Controversies, supra note 63, at 309; Foley, 
Pain Relief, supra note 72, at 2149; Foley, Controlling Pain, supra note 58, at 164. 
76. See Foley, Misconceptions and Controversies, supra note 63, at 309. This 
concern, among others, has prompted Dr. Steven Miles of the University of Min-
nesota Center for Biomedical Ethics to remark that "cancer patients have been 
the victims of friendly fire in the war against drugs." Telephone Interview with 
Steven H. Miles, M.D., Associate Professor, Department of Medicine and Center 
for Biomedical Ethics, University of Minn. (Mar. 20,1997). 
77. See Buchan & Tolle, supra note 22, at 57; see also infra Part IV.CD (dis-
cussing the appropriate role of criminal law in medical decision-making). 
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poorly.78 "Euthanasia," as the term is used correctly, is the inten-
tional killing of a suffering person for reasons of compassion79 -
commonly referred to as "mercy killing.,,8{) Sometimes, this inten-
tional killing also is called "active euthanasia,,,81 to distinguish it 
from an act of withholding or withdrawing medical treatment.82 
The withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment is referred to 
as "passive euthanasia,,,83 an utterly inappropriate and inflammatory 
term for activities well recognized as legally and ethically justifi-
able.54 Although commentators long have used this active/passive 
terminology to describe the critical distinction between active, in-
tentional killing and the withdrawal or withholding of medical 
treatment,85 it should be abandoned. 
Euthanasia also must be distinguished from assisted suicide. 
In assisted suicide, the one who is aiding does not do the ultimate 
life-ending act, but instead provides or helps to provide the means 
used by another person to end his or her own life.86 It may refer to 
a family member who helps arrange some means of suicide,87 such 
as giving a suffering relative a loaded gun. Other times, as in the 
latest circuit court cases,88 assisted suicide may apply to a physician 
who provides a suffering patient with sufficient medication and in-
structions for a life-ending dose.89 The ultimate act, however, is 
done by the person wishing to end his or her own life, not by the 
one supplying the means.90 For many, a critical moral and ethical 
distinction exists between euthanasia and assisted suicide, irrespec-
78. See Ezekiel]. Emanuel, Euthanasia: Historical, Ethical, and Empiric Perspec-
tives, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1890, 1890 (1994). 
79. See ROBERT I. MISBIN, EUTHANASIA: THE GOOD OF THE PATIENT, THE GOOD 
OFSOCIElY 10 (1992). 
80. See id. at 11-12. 
81. See Emanuel, supra note 78, at 1891. 
82. See id. at 1890-91. 
83. [d. at 1891. 
84. See id. (noting that the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment is supported by an ever-widening consensus of ethical literature and is 
permitted by decisions in most states and by the Supreme Court). 
85. SeeMIsBIN, supra note 79, at 11-14. 
86. See Introduction to EUTHANASIA: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 12 (David Bender 
et al. eds., 1995). 
87. See id. 
88. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 719 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 
(1996); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 794-95 (9th Cir.), cert. 
granted, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996). 
89. See Introduction to EUTHANASIA: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, supra note 86, at 
12. 
90. See Pugliese, supra note 34, at 1291-92. 
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tive of the law's treatment of each.91 
In Minnesota, both euthanasia and assisted suicide are illegal. 
Although euthanasia is not defined anywhere in its statutes, such 
an act of intentional, albeit compassionately motivated, killing 
would constitute first-degree murder.92 As in most other states,93 as-
91. See Garbesi, supra note 33, at 109-10. 
92. See MINN. STAT. § 609.185 (1996) ("Whoever does any of the following is 
guilty of murder in the first degree ... : (1) causes the death of a human being 
with premeditation and with intent to effect the death of the person .... "). 
93. At present, 35 states have statutes that explicitly criminalize assisted sui-
cide. See ALAsKA STAT. § 11.41.120(a) (2) (Michie 1996); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 
13-1103(A)(3) (West 1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a) (2) (Michie 1993); CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1997); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-104(1) (b) (Supp. 1996); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-56(a)(2) (1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 645 (1995); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-5(b)-(c) (1996); HAw. 
REv. STAT. Ac"IN. § 707-702(I)(b) (Michie 1993); 720 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/12-
31 (a)(2) (West Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-2.5(b) (Michie Supp. 
1996); RAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 (1995); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 216.302(2)(a)-(b) 
(Michie 1995); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.12(A)(I)-(2) (West Supp. 1997); ME. 
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 204(1) (West 1983); MICH. COMPo LAws Ac"IN. § 
752.1027(1)(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. § 609.215(1) (1996); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.023(1)(2) (West Supp. 1997); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (1995); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-307(1) (1995); N.H. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:4(1) (1996); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-6 (West 1995); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (Michie 1994); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 120.30 (McKinney 1987); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-04(1) (Supp. 1995); OKlA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 813 
(West 1983); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2505(b) (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-
60-3 (A) (a)-(b) (Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 22-16-37 (Michie 1988); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-13-216(a)(I)-(3) (Supp. 1996); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08(a) 
(West 1994); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060(1) (West 1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 940.12 (West 1996). 
Five states criminalize assisted suicide through the common law. See Crook V. 
State, 160 So. 2d 884, 893 (Ala. Ct. App. 1961) ("Suicide is murder at [c]ommon 
[l]aw .... An agreement compassing it is a criminal conspiracy. If one of the 
conspirators dies, ... the survivor - if he contributed to the suicide whether pres-
ent or not - can legitimately be found guilty of murder."); State V. Marti, 290 
N.W.2d 570, 583 (Iowa 1980) ("We believe that preparing and providing a 
weapon for one who is unable to do so and is known to be intoxicated and proba-
bly suicidal are acts 'likely to cause death or serious injury,' within the definition 
of involuntary manslaughter found in section 707.5(2) [of the Iowa Code]."); 
State V. Willis, 121 S.E.2d 854,856-57 (N.C. 1961) ("Since suicide is a crime, one 
who aids and abets another in, or is accessory before the fact to, self[-]murder is 
amendable to the law."); Wackwitz V. Roy, 418 S.E.2d 861, 864 (Va. 1992) 
("[A]lthough the General Assembly has rescinded the punishment for suicide, it 
has not decriminalized the act. Suicide, therefore, remains a common law crime 
in Virginia .... ") ; Md. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 93-036 (Sept. 8, 1993) (conduding 
that assisted suicide is probably a common-law crime in Maryland and recom-
mending that the General Assembly promptly pass a statute prohibiting physician-
assisted suicide). 
Nine states address the subject in living will or death with dignity statutes. 
These acts expressly state that the government neither condones nor legalizes as-
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sisted suicide also is prohibited by statute in Minnesota.94 Never-
theless, the statute now makes an exception for health care provid-
ers who attempt to relieve patients' pain.95 
The 1989 Minnesota investigations involved two deaths follow-
ing the use of morphine.96 The medical examiner ruled the deaths 
homicides.97 This ruling required a determination that the mor-
phine was, in each case, the cause of death98 and that its administra-
tion in the quantities given was wrongful.99 A successful criminal 
prosecution of these cases would have required proof that the doc-
tors either (1) directly intended to kill the patients, so as to be 
guilty of first-degree murder,loo or (2) were so culpably negligent in 
their use of the drug in such quantities as to be guilty of man-
slaughter in the second degree. lOl 
sisted suicide or euthanasia. See IDAHO CODE § 39-152 (Supp. 1996); MAss. ANN. 
LAws ch. 2010, § 12 (Law. Co-op. 1994); NEV. REv. STAT. § 449.670(2) (1995); 
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2133.12(A) (Anderson Supp. 1996); S.C. CoDE ANN. § 44-
78-50 (A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1118 (1993); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5260 (1987); W. VA. CODE § 16-308-2(2) (b) (1995); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 3-5-211 (Michie Supp. 1996). 
Only Oregon has passed, by referendum, legislation explicitly permitting 
physicians to prescribe medication for use by a terminally ill patient to commit 
suicide. See OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.005-.995 (1995). The statute was challenged on 
Fourteenth Amendment grounds, and on August 3, 1995, in Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. 
Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995), it was declared unconstitutional under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's 
judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint for 
lack of jurisdiction. See Lee v. Oregon, Nos. 95-35804, 95-35948, 95-35805; 95-
35949,95-35854,1997 WL 80783, at *8 (9th Cir. Feb. 27, 1997). 
94. See MINN. STAT. § 609.215, subd. 1 (1996) ("Whoever intentionally ad-
vises, encourages, or assists another in taking the other's own life may be sen-
tenced to imprisonment for not more than 15 years or to payment of a fine of not 
more than $30,000 or both."). 
95. See id. subd. (3) (a) (providing immunity for health care workers in cer-
tain circumstances); see also infra notes 302-03 and accompanying text. 
96. See Mark Brunswick, Homicide Rulings Raise Questions About Drug Treatment 
o/Terminally Ill, STAR TRrB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 30, 1989, at 1A. 
97. See id. 
98. See id. 
99. See David Shaffer, Hennepin County Report Urges Painkiller Guidelines, ST. 
PAUL PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH, Apr. 24, 1990, at 1 B. 
100. See MINN. STAT. § 609.185 (1996) (providing that a person is guilty of 
first-degree murder if he or she "causes the death of a human being with pre-
meditation and with intent to effect the death of the person or of another"). 
101. See id. § 609.205 ("A person who causes the death of another by any of 
the following means is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree ... : (1) by 
the person's culpable negligence whereby the person creates an unreasonable 
risk, and consciously takes chances of causing death or great bodily harm to an-
other."). 
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B. The Minnesota Morphine Investigations 
In the spring of 1989, two patients in separate hospitals in 
Hennepin County, Minnesota, died following the withdrawal of 
their mechanical respirators and the administration of relatively 
large doses of morphine to ease the attendant suifering.102 Both 
patients were imminently dying and required the assistance of a 
mechanical ventilator to breathe.
lOg 
In each case, the ventilator was 
withdrawn pursuant to the patient's direction. l04 One patient had 
executed a living will.l05 The other had expressed his wishes in a 
family conference shortly before his death.106 Following expres-
sions of concern by some attending health care workers about the 
amounts of morphine given, the Hennepin County Medical Exam-
iner reviewed both cases.107 The examiner ruled both deaths homi-
cide by morphine poisoning,108 a finding sharply criticized by the 
Minnesota Medical Association and disputed by legal experts. 109 Af-
ter extensive, thoughtful investigation, the Hennepin County At-
torney declined to present the cases to a grand jury for criminal 
• 110 prosecutlOn. 
The cases sparked intense debate and concern in the medical 
• 111 d' . th 112 I fl commumty an actIve comment III e press. n ammatory 
102. See Slovut, supra note 29, at lB. 
103. See id. 
104. See David Shaffer, Two Hennepin Agencies Urge Guidelines on Painkillers, 
ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS DISP., Apr. 25, 1990, at lB. 
105. See id. 
106. SeeSlovut, supra note 29, at lB. 
107. See id. 
108. See Miriam K. Feldman, Pain Control in Dying Patients, MINN. MED., Oct. 
1990, at 19,20. 
109. See id. Feldman argues that because of the Minnesota investigations, 
patients are not receiving adequate pain relief and that it "will continue to hap-
pen until physicians learn more about pain management and about the legal and 
ethical precedent that supports good medical judgment." Id. at 20. 
110. For former Hennepin County Attorney Tom Johnson's account of the 
investigations and his reasons for declining to prosecute these cases, see Johnson, 
supra note 24, at 10-11. Johnson felt that a first-degree murder charge would fail, 
because it requires the state to prove that the death was intentional and premedi-
tated. Intent is difficult to prove because of the ethical maxim known as the 
"principle of the double effect." The principle permits the administration of 
pain-killing drugs to a dying patient even if it is foreseeable that the medication 
could shorten the patient's life. See id. at 11; see also infra notes 183-86 and ac-
companying text. 
111. See Feldman, supra note 108, at 19. 
112. See, e.g., Arthur Caplan, Nazi Analogy Is Inaccurate and Offensive, ST. PAUL 
PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH, Apr. 30, 1990, at lC. 
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rhetoric abounded. The self-proclaimed "pro-life" movement im-
mediately labeled the cases instances of active euthanasia. m Much 
of the medical community, already feeling beleaguered by mal-
practice claims, now believed it also had to fear criminal liability 
for some very common end-of-life medical treatment decisions.1I4 
Physicians caring for dying patients saw their judgments being sub-
jected to review not only by civil lawyers examining negligence 
claims, but by prosecuting authorities looking for crime as well. In 
the ensuing years, considerable anecdotal evidence from local hos-
pitals has shown that some terminally ill cancer patients have been 
medicated inadequately for pain, because their doctors have feared 
being subjected either to a criminal investigation or to an inquiry 
from the state's medical licensing board. 1I5 As one hospice nurse-
administrator remarked, the investigations "set palliative care back 
fi ,,116 lve years. 
The investigations, though not unprecedented, were highly 
unusual. They raised questions whose resolution lay at the inter-
section of law, medicine, and ethics. 1l7 It became clear rather 
quickly that little guidance on the precise issue exists. Consider-
able literature is available on the ethical issues involved in decisions 
to forego life-sustaining treatment of terminally ill patients. liS In 
addition, a well-developed body of case law supporting such deci-
sions exists. 1I9 Precious little has been written, however, to help 
physicians implement decisions to withdraw or withhold specific 
interventions, while at the same time providing their dying patients 
113. See Terminally Ill: Don't Let Painkiller Rules Chill Final Care, ST. PAUL 
PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH, Apr. 30, 1990, at lOA. 
114. See Cook & Parker, supra note 31, at 1A. 
115. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 108, at 20; Walter Parker, Medicine, Law 
Clash over Morphine, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH, Oct. 2, 1989, at 1A. 
116. Interview with Kate Cummings, R.N., Metropolitan Medical Center 
(Spring 1989). 
117. See Garbesi, supra note 33, at 109-10. 
118. See, e.g., H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICS 
(1986); ETHICS AND LAw IN HEALTH CARE AND RESEARCH (Peter Byrne ed., 1990); 
EUTHANASIA: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS (David Bender et al. eds., 1995). 
119. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 
(1990) (recognizing that a "competent person has a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment"); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 
647, 663 (NJ.) (concluding that the unwritten constitutional right of privacy in-
cludes an individual's right to refuse unwanted medical interventions), eert. denied, 
429 U.S. 922 (1976); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 
N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass. 1977) (recognizing that ethical medical practice does not 
require that all life-prolonging interventions be attempted in all cases). 
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with good palliative care. 120 This guidance void has created consid-
erable misunderstanding in the medical community. Conse-
quently, this misunderstanding has led members of the medical 
community to fear the potential legal repercussions if practitioners 
exceed what they perceive as murky boundaries.121 The investiga-
tions in the morphine cases fueled those fears. 
C. The Law of Treatment Withdrawal 
1. The Courts' Response to Treatment Withdrawal 
Each of the Minnesota investigations involved the withdrawal 
of a mechanical ventilator from a dying patient, whose previously 
expressed wishes were being honored.122 In this respect, the cases 
were perhaps the least controversial of any at the intersection of 
biomedical ethics and the law.123 It is well-settled that a competent 
adult patient has the right to forego any life-prolonging interven-
tion.124 This right of autonomous decision-making has been upheld 
repeatedly and has been grounded in both the constitutional right 
to privacy125 and the common-law right to bodily self-
120. See Feldman, supra note 108, at 20. In recent years, palliative care spe-
cialists have developed guidelines for the aggressive management of pain and suf-
fering at the end of life, but it still appears that most physicians are not familiar 
with them. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. 
121. See, e.g., Wanzer, Physician's Responsibility, supra note 24, at 956 (stating 
that physicians fail to treat the pain of dying patients adequately because of their 
fear of criminal sanctions). 
122. See Shaffer, supra note 104, at lB. 
123. The most controversial cases usually involve the withdrawal of tubes 
which supply nutrition and hydration from incompetent patients who have ex-
pressed no preferences about such care. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of 
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); State v. Herbert, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990); In re Mar-
tin, 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. 1995); In reWestchester County Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 
607 (N.Y. 1988). 
124. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302 (Ct. App. 
1986) (holding that a mentally competent patient had the right to remove a naso-
gastric tube involuntarily inserted into her body, even though the patient was not 
terminally ill); Norwood Hosp. v. Munoz, 564 N.E.2d 1017,1024 (Mass. 1991) (as-
serting that a state's interest in protecting the well-being of the patient's child did 
not outweigh the patient's right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment). 
125. See, e.g., Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 301 (affirming that an individual's ba-
sic right to refuse medical treatment is recognized as part of the federal and state 
constitutional rights to privacy); Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 
225 (Ct. App. 1984) (stating that the right of a competent adult patient to refuse 
medical treatment originated in the constitutional right to privacy); Superinten-
dent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass. 1977) 
(stating that a person's constitutional right to privacy encompasses the right to 
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determination. 126 In 1990, the United States Supreme Court, in 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department oj Health,127 acknowledged 
that a competent patient has a constitutionally protected liberty in-
terest in refusing unwanted medical treatment as well. 128 The right 
to refuse treatment has been upheld even in the case of an incom-
petent patient whose family or court-appointed guardian requests 
the withdrawal of treatment on the patient's behalf, either because 
it is what the patient would have wanted,l29 or because it is in the 
patient's best interests. ISO 
refuse "unwanted infringements of bodily integrity in appropriate circum-
stances"); Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663 (stating that the constitutional right to privacy 
is broad enough to include a patient's decision to refuse medical treatment in 
certain circumstances). 
126. See, e.g., Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1099 (Kan.) (recognizing 
that because Anglo-American law is premised on self-determination, a patient may 
refuse lifesaving surgery or other medical treatment), clari[zed, 354 P.2d 670 (Kan. 
1960); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947,950 (Me. 1987) (reiterating the long-standing 
common-law right of every individual to control his or her own person without 
interference from others); Schloendorffv. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92,93 
(N.Y. 1914) ("Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his [or her] own body."). 
127. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
128. !d. at 278 ("The principle that a competent person has a constitution-
ally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be in-
ferred from our prior decisions."). 
129. See, e.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 587-88 (D.R.1. 1988) (con-
cluding that in balancing the patient's constitutional right to refuse life support 
against the competing governmental interest, one must consider evidence that if 
the patient were competent, she would decline life support); In re Estate of 
Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 300 (Ill. 1989) (holding that the key element in de-
termining whether to allow withdrawal of artificial sustenance is proof, by clear 
and convincing evidence, of the patient's intent); Brophy v. New England Sinai 
Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (Mass. 1986) (taking into account the patient's views 
pertaining to life support when ascertaining whether to honor the substituted 
judgment of an incompetent person in a persistent vegetative state to refuse the 
continuance of life support); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. 
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (Mass. 1977) (holding that courts should attempt 
to determine the incompetent person's preferences regarding medical treat-
ment); Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664 (holding that the only practical way for an in-
competent patient to assert the privacy right to terminate treatment is for a guard-
ian to determine whether the patient would have wanted to exercise that right); 
In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607,613 (N.Y. 1988) (holding that 
the decision to withhold or withdraw treatment must always be based on the pa-
tient's expressed intentions). 
130. See, e.g., In re Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 857 (Ct. 
App. 1988) (holding that California law allows a conservator of an incompetent 
person in a vegetative state to withdraw artificial life support if the withdrawal is in 
the patient's best interests); In re Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 337 
(Minn. 1984) (stating that a court may allow a conservator to order the removal of 
life support if it is in the patient's best interests); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 
HeinOnline -- 23 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 345 1997
1997] PAIN RELIEF FOR THE DYING 345 
The Cruzan case involved the withdrawal of medical interven-
tions from an incompetent patient. lSI Nancy Cruzan had been in a 
persistent vegetative state for almost eight years132 when her par-
ents, as her legal guardians, sought court permission to end her ar-
tificial feeding. 133 The Missouri Supreme Court required the 
Cruzans to prove by clear and convincing evidence that their 
daughter would have wanted her feeding tube disconnected under 
the circumstances. l34 This proof of Nancy's wishes was to be 
gleaned from her prior expressions. 135 On appeal, the United 
States Supreme Court recognized in dictum a constitutionally pro-
tected right in the competent patient to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment and indicated that a competent person might have a lib-
erty interest in refusing artificially-delivered fluids and nutrition.136 
Nevertheless, it upheld Missouri's very stringent evidentiary re-
quirement that when a guardian seeks to have a feeding tube with-
drawn from a permanently unconscious patient, there must be 
clear and convincing proof that the patient would want to have the 
feeding tube withdrawn.137 
The Cruzan case must be carefully distinguished from the vast 
majority of treatment termination cases which have come before 
the courts and from the two Minnesota cases discussed previously. 
Cruzan involved the withdrawal of a feeding tube from a patient 
who was permanently unconscious, but not dying, and whose 
wishes on the subject, it was argued, could not be reliably deter-
1232 (NJ. 1985) (ruling that in the absence of evidence indicating the patient's 
intent to decline medical treatment, life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or 
withdrawn from a formerly competent person if the burden of treatment out-
weighs its benefit). 
131. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 265. 
132. [d. at 266. 
133. [d. at 265. 
134. [d. 
135. [d. at 268. 
136. [d. at 278-79. 
137. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284 (concluding that a state "may apply a clear and 
convincing evidence standard in proceedings where a guardian seeks to discon-
tinue nutrition and hydration of a person diagnosed to be in a persistent vegeta-
tive state"). Mter the Supreme Court issued its decision, another hearing was 
held before a county probate judge to determine whether, under the newly ar-
ticulated "clear and convincing" standard, sufficient evidence of Nancy'S wishes 
existed to justify removing the feeding tube. The judge ruled that there was suffi-
cient evidence, and the state did not appeal. Tlie tube was removed, and Nancy 
Cruzan died on December 26, 1990, 11 days later. See 1 ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT 
TO DIE § 2.3, at 4445 (2d ed. 1995). 
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mined. ISS Further, the Cruzan decision merely affirmed the Mis-
souri Supreme Court opinion.
139 It does not affect the law in any 
other state. 140 It is also significant to note that the Cruzan case in-
volved artificial feeding, 141 an intervention about which there is not 
full societal consensus.142 Tube feeding involves important emo-
tional factors, largely the result of the symbolism we attach to pro-
viding sustenance to the vulnerable, that are not present in cases 
involving mechanical ventilators. 143 
2. Withdrawal of Ventilators: Why Courts Treat It Differently 
Perhaps the most famous case involving the removal of a respi-
rator from a patient is that of Karen Ann Quinlan. l44 On April 15, 
1975, Karen was taken to the hospital after she "ceased breathing 
for at least two fifteen minute periods.,,145 Thereafter, her condi-
tion worsened and it was determined that she was in a chronic, per-
sistent vegetative state, needing twenty-four hour intensive nursing 
care and the assistance of a respirator, a catheter, and a feeding 
tube. 146 Joseph Quinlan, Karen's father, wished to be appointed 
guardian of his daughter and to be allowed to authorize the dis-
continuance of her ventilator support. 147 In a landmark decision, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court allowed her parents to order her 
138. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 265-69. 
139. See id. at 287. 
140. See JAMES M. HOEFLER & BRIAN E. KAMOIE, DEATHRIGHT: CULTURE, 
MEDICINE, POUTICS, AND THE RIGHT TO DIE 182-83 (1994); Alan Meisel, A Retrospec-
tive on Cruzan, 20 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 340, 343, 345 (1992) (observing that 
the Court, in rendering its decision, focused solely on the validity of the Missouri 
Supreme Court's holding, but failed to promulgate a national policy). 
141. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 26l. 
142. See GEORGE M. BURNELL, M.D., FINAL CHOICES: To LIVE OR TO DIE IN AN 
AGE OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY lO6-11 (1993) (discussing the competing viewpoints 
as to whether providing food and water is a necessary and ordinary treatment). 
143. See Bryan Jennett, Letting Vegetative Patients Die, in EUTHANASIA 
EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CUNICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 169, 181-82 Oohn Keown 
ed., 1995); see also Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490 (Ct. App. 
1983) (recognizing that the distinction between cases involving mechanical 
breathing devices and those involving mechanical feeding devices is based more 
on emotional symbolism than on rational differences). 
144. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
The Quinlan court determined that under appropriate circumstances, a comatose 
patient's family may order the removal of the patient's ventilator. Id. at 651. 
145. Id. at 653-54. The reason why Karen stopped breathing is still unclear. 
Id. 
146. Id. at 654. 
147. Id. at 651. 
HeinOnline -- 23 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 347 1997
1997] PAIN RELIEF FOR THE DYING 347 
respirator disconnected. 14B The court determined that the state's 
interest in the preservation and the sanctity of human life was out-
weighed by Karen's individual right to decline medical treatment 
under such circumstances, a right which her family could exercise 
on her behalf. 149 Since In re Quinlan, decisions to forego ventilator 
use have been readily upheld.150 
The use of ventilators to keep patients alive always has been 
considered highly unnatural, intrusive and, in the language of the 
Catholic Church, "extraordinary."l5l Traditionally, Catholic moral 
theology drew a distinction between "ordinary" and "extraordi-
nary" means of preserving life.152 The term "ordinary means" refers 
to "all medicines, treatments and operations, which offer a reason-
able hope of benefit for the patient and which can be obtained and 
used without excessive expense, pain or other inconvenience.,,153 
"Extraordinary means" are "all medicines, treatments, and opera-
tions, which cannot be obtained or used without excessive expense, 
pain, or other inconvenience, or which, if used, would not offer a 
148. /d. at 671. 
149. Id. at 663-64. This individual right arises when the attending physician 
and the facility ethics committee agree that: 1) there is no reasonable possibility 
of the patient ever emerging from the comatose condition to a cognitive state; 
and 2) the life-support apparatus should be discontinued. Id. at 671-72. The 
court further noted that the decision ultimately rested with Karen. But since she 
was grossly incompetent and thus unable to assert her rights, her guardian or fam-
ily members could render their best judgment as to whether Karen would exercise 
her right to discontinue treatment in these circumstances. Id. at 664. 
150. See, e.g., McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 625 (Nev. 1990) (holding 
that the patient's liberty interest in refusing the use of a respirator to sustain his 
life outweighed the state's interest in preserving his life); In re Eichner, 420 
N.E.2d 64, 72 (N.Y. 1981) (approving the withdrawal of a patient's respirator 
where the patient had expressed his views prior to becoming incompetent); In re 
Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 454 (Wash. 1987) (stating that the right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment extends to all artificial procedures intended to prolong the 
life of a terminally ill patient, including a ventilator), modifzed, 757 P.2d 534 
(Wash. 1988). 
151. See GERALD KELLY, MEDICo-MORAL PROBLEMS 129 (1958). The Roman 
Catholic Church is by far the largest single religious body in the United States. See 
Reverend Richard E. Coleson, Contemporary Religious Viewpoints on Suicide, Physi-
cian-Assisted Suicide, and Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 35 DUQ. L. REv. 43, 45 (1996). 
Its views are significant for several reasons, including "the church's (1) long his-
tory of moral scholarship; (2) extensive and articulate contemporary pronounce-
ments on moral issues; (3) large and influential worldwide presence; and (4) 
strongly hierarchical structure, which permits a central authority to speak authori-
tatively for the church.» Id. at 45 n.11. 
152. See KELLY, supra note 151, at 129. 
153. Id. 
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reasonable hope of benefit.,,154 This distinction between ordinary 
and extraordinary means remains important, and the Catholic 
Church continues to be an articulate, well-respected authority on 
issues relating to termination of treatment in the dying patient. 155 
The "extraordinary/ordinary" language, however, has been aban-
doned in virtually all medical ethics writings and in most court de-
cisions, in favor of a discussion that evaluates the treatment inter-
vention by weighing the burdens it imposes against the benefits it -= d th . 156 may dllor to e patIent. 
Ethically, the obligation to sustain life, while an important one 
for the medical profession, is not absolute. Not only does the doc-
trine of proportionality temper this duty, it also is necessary to 
evaluate the responsibility to sustain life in light of the duty to 
promote patient well-being. 157 In other words, the duty to promote 
patient well-being requires an assessment of whether a life-
sustaining intervention will prove more beneficial than burden-
some to the patient. 15S This assessment, and decisions about the 
withdrawal or refusal of the intervention, reside primarily with the 
patient or his legal surrogate, rather. than with the physician. 159 
Barber v. Superior Court>!) emphasizes this point. 
The patient in Barber suffered severe brain damage, leaving 
him in a likely permanent vegetative state. 161 The patient's family, 
154. [d. 
155. Other religions have different views. For example, Judaism does not 
permit euthanasia because of its strong belief in the preservation of life. Many 
Rabbinic interpretations, however, conclude that Judaism does permit suicide and 
the withdrawal of life support if the patient is near death and in great pain. Islam 
also endorses the principle that life should be preserved. Therefore, it does not 
permit suicide, euthanasia, or the withdrawal of life support. See Matthew P. Pre-
vin, Note, Assisted Suicide and Religion: Conflicting Conceptions of the Sanctity of Hu-
man Life, 84 CEO. LJ. 589, 596-97 (1996). 
156. See, e.g., 1 MEISEL, supra note 137, § 8.14, at 502 (stating that when de-
ciding whether to forego life-sustaining treatment, the balancing approach is the 
most frequently used); Wanzer, A Second Look, supra note 22, at 846; see also Barber 
v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491 (Ct. App. 1983) (weighing the benefits 
of the proposed treatment against the burdens it would impose on the patient). 
157. See Wanzer, A Second Look, supra note 22, at 846. "Somewhere between 
the unacceptable extremes offailure to treat the dying patient and intolerable use 
of aggressive life-sustaining measures, the physician must seek a level of care that 
optimizes comfort and dignity." [d. 
158. See id. 
159. See Wanzer, Physician's Responsibility, supra note 24, at 955. 
160. 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Ct. App. 1983). 
161. [d. at 486. The patient suffered a cardio-respiratory arrest and was re-
vived, but remained in a comatose state. After examining him, the physicians de-
termined that the patient also had suffered brain damage and that his vegetative 
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upon learning of the dim prognosis for recovery, requested in writ-
ing that the hospital discontinue the use of all life support ma-
chines. 162 Responding to the family's wishes, two doctors removed 
the ventilator and other life-sustaining equipment.165 Mter the pa-
tient died, the doctors were charged with murder and conspiracy to 
. d 164 commit mur er. 
In determining whether the two doctors should be held to an-
swer the charges, the court considered whether the doctors had a 
duty to continue to provide life-sustaining treatment. 165 The court 
held that no duty to continue the use of life-sustaining machines 
exists once their use has become "futile in the opinion of qualified 
medical personnel.,,166 Continued life support becomes futile or 
"disproportionate," the court said, when the benefits to be gained 
from the proposed treatment are outweighed by the burdens to 
which it would subject the patient. 167 "[PJroportionate treatment is 
that which, in the view of the patient, has at least a reasonable chance 
of providing benefits to the patient, which benefits outweigh the 
burdens attendant to the treatment."I68 The court acknowledged 
that the determination as to whether the burdens of treatment are 
worth enduring for any individual patient depends on the unique 
. f h 169 CIrcumstances 0 eac case. 
Thus, the Barber court recognized that a ventilator may be dis-
continued when the burdens of the intervention are greater than 
the b~nefits.170 The patient should be the ultimate decision-maker 
regarding the burden issue, unless the patient is incapable of mak-
ing this decision due to his or her medical condition or for other 
reasons. l7l It is important to keep in mind, then, that ventilator-
dependent patients are legally and ethically entitled to decide to 
have their ventilator support withdrawn and to die.172 The critical 




165. ld. at 490. 
166. Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491. 
167. ld. 
168. ld. (emphasis added). 
169. ld. at 492. 
170. ld. 
171. ld. The court admitted difficulty in detennining who should have the 
power to make the decision when the patient is incapacitated; however, it implied 
that the decision should reside with the patient's family. ld. 
172. See cases cited supra note 150; see also Wanzer, Physician's Responsibility, 
supra note 24, at 955 (addressing the importance of the patient's role in decision-
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question is what procedures physicians should follow when with-
drawing such ventilator support. 
The answer to this question is of crucial importance for venti-
lator-dependent patients who are dying. The "air-hunger" or suf-
focation that characterizes the dying of a ventilator-dependent pa-
tient from whom breathing support has been withdrawn is a 
peculiar and acute suffering.m Morphine is well-accepted as the 
most effective palliative drug to alleviate this distress. 174 Often, 
however, dying patients needlessly suffer because of the inadequate 
administration of morphine and other opioid pain-relieving medi-
cations.175 A variety of reasons have been offered for physicians' re-
luctance to medicate adequately in this situation. 176 It is clear, how-
ever, that misconceptions about both the use of morphine and the 
application of the criminal law to such situations have contributed 
to the problem. 177 
It would, of course, be unjustifiable homicide for doctors de-
liberately to give patients an overdose of narcotics or sedatives for 
the purpose of ending life quickly.17s Yet, after the ventilator is 
withdrawn, it becomes the physician's ethical responsibility to pro-
vide whatever amount of medication is necessary to relieve any ap-
parent symptoms of pain and suffering, so as to make the dying 
process comfortable and peaceful. l79 Indeed, the ethics literature 
emphasizes that once curative efforts have been discontinued, the 
physician's primary goal in caring for dying patients is to relieve 
their pain and suffering. ISO If, in so doing, a physician administers 
making). 
173. See Feldman, supra note 108, at 20. 
174. See Foley, Misconceptions and Controversies, supra note 63, at 6 (noting 
that morphine is the preferred drug according to the World Health Organiza-
tion's Cancer Pain Guidelines). 
175. See supra notes 5~71 and accompanying text. 
176. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text. 
177. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
178. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subd. 9(3) (1996). If the physician's 
purpose is to end the patient's life, rather than relieve pain, then the "inten-
tional" element of homicide is satisfied. See id. But if. MEISEL, supra note 137, § 
18.18, at 479 ("The taking of the life of another person by some affirmative 
act ... , regardless of the fact that the motive may be the relief of suffering, is cul-
pable homicide."). . 
179. See Buchan & Tolle, supra note 22, at 54-55; Wanzer, A Second Look, su-
pra note 22, at 847 ("The proper dose of pain medication is the dose that is suffi-
cient to relieve pain and suffering, even to the point of unconsciousness."). 
180. See THE HAsTINGS CENTER, GUIDEUNES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-
SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING 74 (1987); Wanzer, A Second 
Look, supra note 22, at 84M7. See generally THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE 
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morphine in such amounts that he or she hastens death by depress-
ing the patient's respiration, no liability arises. lSI Ethically and le-
gally, a physician's actions are protected if the intent was to relieve 
suffering, even though as a necessary incident, the patient's life is 
shortened. 182 
D. The Principle of Double Effect 
The problem of administering pain medication to dying pa-
tients is an old one in medical ethics. The principles which govern 
it have a long and respected tradition beginning, it is believed, with 
St. Thomas Aquinas' notion of praeter intentionem. ls3 As it has come 
to be known, the principle of double effect is used to analyze the 
morality of actions that involve more than one effect, specifically 
one good and one evil consequence.
IS4 
The principle of double ef-
fect states that an action that has an evil consequence as well as a 
good one can be justified if it satisfies four conditions: 
STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL 
REsEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING 'TREATMENT: ETHICAL, MEDICAL 
AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S 
COMMISSION] (reporting on the ethical, medical, and legal issues in treatment de-
cisions). 
181. See Wanzer, A Second Look, supra note 22, at 847. 
182. Some physicians have recognized in themselves what Dr. Timothy Quill 
has called the "ambiguity of clinical intention." Timothy E. Quill, M.D., The Ambi-
guity ofClinicalIntfmtions, 329 NEWENG.J. MEn. 1039, 1039 (1993). That is, when 
they give heavy narcotics to relieve their patients' severe suffering, these physi-
cians are aware that in addition to a desire to relieve the patients' pain, they 
sometimes harbor feelings that death would not be unwelcome. Indeed, they may 
often hope that death will come sooner, rather than later, to these desperately ill 
patients. See id. Still, for purposes of the criminal law, intfmt requires more than 
the knowledge that there is an increased risk of hastening death and an ancillary 
hope that the patient's suffering will not continue too long. "'Intentionally' 
means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result 
specified [i.e., the death of the patient] or believes that the act ... , if successful, will 
cause that result." MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subd. 9(3) (1996) (emphasis added). 
Knowing that an increased risk of death from large doses of some medications ex-
ists - even when the belief that the patient's death would be a good thing accom-
panies that knowledge - does not constitute the required mental state in these 
cases. 
183. See THE WESTMINSTER DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 162 Games F. 
Childress & John Macquarrie eds., 1986) (defining praeter intfmtionem to mean a 
resulting wrong or evil consequence of an action which is "not directly sought" or 
"an unintended by-product of the action"); Kevin J. Flannery, Natural Law Mens 
Rea Versus the Benthamite Tradition, 40 AM. J. JURIS. 377, 394 n.52 (1995) (stating 
that praeter intfmtionem means a wrongful consequence of an action which is "out-
side the intention" of that action). 
184. See Flannery, supra note 183, at 394-95 nn.52 & 54. 
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(1) The action from which evil results is good or indiffer-
ent in itself; it is not morally evil. (2) The intention of the 
agent is upright - i.e., the evil effect is sincerely not in-
tended. (3) The evil effect must be equally immediate 
causally with the good effect, for otherwise it would be a 
means to the good effect and would be intended. (4) 
There must be a proportionately grave reason for allow-
ing the evil to occur. IS 
The use of morphine in the dying patient is a classic illustra-
tion of the principle in action. The good effect of the morphine is 
the relief of suffering; the bad effect is the possible hastening of 
death. The first element of the principle of double effect is met 
because when the physician administers morphine to the patient, 
the physician does not bring about the relief of suffering by means 
of weakening the patient's condition. Thus, the evil effect is not the 
means to the desired effect and the action is not morally evil. The 
second condition also is satisfied. The intent of the doctor is to re-
lieve the patient's suffering, not to kill the patient. The adverse ef-
fect, possibly hastening the patient's death, comes from dangers 
inherent in the use of the drug and is not intended; rather; it is a 
necessary risk. Third, both the good and the evil effects result si-
multaneously. The risk of speeding the patient's death occurs at 
the same time as the benefit of relieving the patient's pain. Finally, 
the relief of suffering in the dying patient is critically important. 
The physician's primary duty is to relieve the patient's pain and 
suffering once curative efforts have ceased. This duty provides am-
ple reason for using the morphine in whatever dosage is necessary 
to accomplish that goal. IS6 Therefore, the principle of double ef-
185. THE WESTMINSTER DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS, supra note 183, at 
162; accord ENGELHARDT, supra note 118, at 307. It is interesting to note that in his 
second trial for assisted suicide, Dr. Kevorkian asserted - despite his prior public 
statements to the contrary - that his goal was primarily to relieve suffering, and 
that the deaths were an unavoidable consequence of that goal. See Kevorkian Says 
He's Like an Executioner, FLA. TODAY, Mar. 5, 1996, at 6A; Barbara Dority, "In the 
Hands of the People": Recent Victories of the Death-with-Dignity Movement, HUMANIST, 
July 17, 1996, at 6. It is difficult to see how, even under the most generous inter-
pretation of his actions, the principle of double effect would apply to protect Kev-
orkian. The first requirement of double effect is that the evil effect (the death of 
the patient) must not be the means to produce the good effect (the relief of suf-
fering). See ENGELHARDT, supra note 118, at 307. No one could seriously contend 
that potassium chloride (whose only purpose when used this way is to stop a beat-
ing heart) and carbon monoxide are pain relief medications which carry a neces-
sary and unavoidable risk of death. 
186. See JOHN ARRAs & NANCY RHODEN, ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE 
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fect fully justifies the use of enough morphine and other analgesic 
drugs to relieve pain in terminally ill patients, even at the risk of 
shortening their lives. 
IV. EXAGGERATED FEARs OF CRIMINAL LIABILI'IY 
In many cases, medical professionals have a greatly exagger-
ated fear of legal liability.ls7 It is possible to put these fears into 
perspective, however, by understanding just how infrequently doc-
tors have been charged with criminal conduct in connection with 
medical treatment decisions of any kind, including those which 
have involved intentional killings and are clear cases of murder. 188 
Notably, no physician has ever lost a civil casel89 or been crimi-
nally convictedl90 based on a decision to withhold or withdraw 
treatment from a terminally ill patient.191 Even more remarkable, 
no doctor has ever been successfully prosecuted for a direct act of 
euthanasia. 192 Even among the relatively small number of non-
medical defendants charged with "mercy killing," convictions are 
rare,193 sentences that amount to anything significant are rarer 
'11 194 d . llifi" 195 SO, an JUry nu Icaoon IS common. 
27 (3d ed. 1989) and THE WESTMINSTER DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS, supra 
note 183, at 162, for good discussions of this principle. The Roman Catholic 
Church has approved the specific applicability of the principle of double effect to 
the use of narcotics to relieve suffering in the dying. See THE WESTMINSTER 
DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS, supra note 183, at 163. 
187. See Buchan & Tolle, supra note 22, at 57 ("To our knowledge, no physi-
cian in the United States has ever been convicted of murder or assisted suicide for 
providing a patient with appropriate high-dose pain medication."); Wanzer, Physi-
cian's Responsibility, supra note 24, at 956 (noting that criminal charges against 
physicians who withdraw life support are rare). 
188. See Glantz, supra note 24, at 231, for an excellent discussion of this is-
sue and a review of some of the cases. 
189. See id. at 235-36. 
190. See id. at 232, 240; Wanzer, Physician's Responsibility, supra note 24, at 
956. 
191. See Glantz, supra note 24, at 235. 
192. See id. at 232-34. 
193. See id. (listing cases involving "mercy killings" by non-medical defen-
dants). 
194. See id. at 234. For example, the author cites a case involving a father 
who killed his bedridden son using chloroform. The jury convicted the defen-
dant of second-degree manslaughter, but the defendant was given a suspended 
sentence and released. See id. at 232. 
195. See id. at 232-33 (noting several cases in which the grand jury refused to 
indict or acquit based on temporary insanity). 
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A. Cases Involving Intentional Killing by Physicians 
Few physicians and other health care providers have ever been 
charged criminally with intentionally killing a patient. One of the 
few cases involved Dr. Herman Sander, who, in 1950, injected air 
into the veins of a terminally ill cancer patient. 196 Dr. Sander noted 
in the patient's chart: "Patient was given 10 C.c. of air intravenously 
repeated four times. Expired within ten minutes after this was 
started." 197 Despite the clear evidence and the obvious homicidal 
(albeit benignly motivated) intent of the defendant, he was acquit-
ted. 19B 
Other cases have had similar results. In 1973, a jury acquitted 
Dr. Vincent Montemarano of killing a cancer patient with an injec-
tion of potassium chloride. l99 In 1981, Anne Capute, a nurse, was 
charged with murdering a suffering, terminally ill patient by ad-
ministering large doses of morphine.20o Like Dr. Sander, Ms. 
Capute carefully had documented her acts with respect to the pa-
tient, noting that she gave the patient 195 milligrams of morphine 
within seven hours of death.201 The prosecution presented four 
medical experts who testified that the morphine caused the pa-
tient's death.202 Still, the jury acquitted the nurse.203 In 1986, Dr. 
Peter Rosier administered a morphine overdose to his terminally ill 
wife but was unsuccessful in causing her death.204 He was acquitted, 
however, for his role in attempting to assist in her suicide.205 
Other recent cases have had different results, but still no jury 
verdicts of guilty and no prison sentences.206 In 1986, Dr. Joseph 
Hassman was charged with manslaughter after injecting his termi-
196. See id. at 233. 
197. Glantz, supra note 24, at 233. 
198. See id. (noting that 90% of the townspeople signed a petition support-
ing the doctor). 
199. See id. 
200. See id. at 234. 
201. See id. 
202. See id. To rebut the prosecution's evidence, the defense called three 
medical experts who testified that cancer and heart and lung disease caused the 
patient's death. See id. 
203. See Glantz, supra note 24, at 234. 
204. See Jim Persels, Farcing the Issue of Physician-Assisted Suicide: Impact of the 
Kevarkian Case on the Euthanasia Debate, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 93, 112 (1993). 
205. See id. Because Dr. Rosier's efforts failed to kill his wife, her stepfather 
finished the task by suffocating her with a pillow. See id. at 112 n.152. 
206. See id. at 110-12; T. Howard Stone & William J. Winslade, Physician-
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the United States: Legal and Ethical Observations, 16 
J. LEGALMED. 481, 493-94 (1995). 
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nally ill mother-in-law with an overdose of Demeroeo7 He pled 
guilty and was given two years probation.2oB In 1988, Dr. Donald 
Caracdo was charged with murder after injecting a patient with po-
tassium chloride.209 Dr. Caraccio pled guilty and was sentenced to 
fi b · 210 lve years pro aUon. 
In England, the story has been much the same.211 In 1981, Dr. 
Leonard Arthur acceded to the request of parents of a Down's 
Syndrome infant that the baby be allowed to die.212 The infant died 
after sixty-nine hours without being fed and after being given dihy-
drocodeine, an opiate drug, to alleviate his distress. 213 Mter being 
charged with murder, Dr. Arthur contended that the death was due 
to Down's Syndrome-induced broncho-pneumonia.214 The prose-
cution asserted, however, that lung stasis resulting from the drug's 
toxicity was the cause of death.215 In one of the few English prose-
cutions of a physician to go to a jury, Dr. Arthur was acquitted.216 
More recently, in 1986, a jury acquitted another physician of at-
tempted murder after he administered barbiturates to a patient 
suffering from inoperable lung cancer.217 
In the earliest and most infamous English case, Dr. John Bod-
kin Adams was prosecuted for causing a patient's death by adminis-
tering excessive doses of heroin and morphine.218 The court in-
structed the jury that the law does not recognize a special defense 
for acting to prevent severe pain.219 It continued, however, by stat-
ing that a doctor need not calculate in any precise manner the ef-
fect of medicines upon a patient's life and may do all that is neces-
sary at the end of life to relieve suffering, even employing measures 
that may "incidentally shorten human life.,,220 "If a person is being 
treated for an illness and that treatment has the incidental effect of 
207. See Persels, supra note 204, at 112. 
208. See id. 
209. See id. 
210. See id. 
211. See DAVID W. MEYERS, THE HUMAN BODY AND THE LAw 282-83 (2d ed. 
1990) (detailing cases of English physicians who brought about the deaths of pa-
tients through prescription drugs). 
212. See id. at 282. 
213. See id. 
214. See id. 
215. See id. 
216. See id. at 283. 
217. See MEYERS, supra note 211, at 282. 
218. See id. at 283. 
219. See id. 
220. Id. 
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determining the exact moment of death, it could not be said that 
the doctor caused the patient's death.,,221 The jury returned a ver-
dict of not. guilty. 222 Other countries have been similarly reluctant 
to prosecute physicians for helping terminally ill patients end their 
1· 223 Ives. 
In many of the cases in which physicians have been charged 
with intentional killings, the defendants were acquitted following 
defenses asserting that the prosecution was unable to prove causa-
tion.224 It is unclear whether these were actually cases in which the 
prosecution had difficulty proving causation beyond, a reasonable 
doubt - a very real possibility given the extreme cirtumstances of 
the patients225 - or were simply cases of jury nullification corre-
sponding with feelings of compassion. In any event, the inability of 
the state to procure convictions in these cases of direct medical kill-
ing suggests that, absent very aggravated facts, the prosecution al-
ways has an uphill battle. 
221. Id. at 284. 
222. See id. at 283. 
223. While assisted suicide is illegal in the Netherlands, its physicians openly 
practice it. If doctors follow the Royal Dutch Medical Association's strict proce-
dures, the government will not prosecute them. However, assisted suicide is con-
sidered as a treatment choice only when all other options for terminally ill pa-
tients have been exhausted. See Alison C. Hall, Note, To Die with Dignity: 
Comparing Physician-Assisted Suicide in the United States,japan, and the Netherlands, 74 
WASH. U. L.Q. 803, 825 (1996). 
In 1995, Australia's Northern Territory passed the Northern Territory Rights 
of the Terminally III Act. The Act allows physicians to prescribe and administer 
lethal substances to terminally ill patients who formally request assistance in end-
ing their lives. See Christopher James Ryan & Miranda Kaye, Euthanasia in Austra-
lia - The Northern Territory Rights of the Terminally III Act, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 326, 
326 (1996). In all other Australian states, voluntary euthanasia and assisted sui-
cide remain illegal, "although some have recently enacted laws recognizing a right 
to have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn and protecting members of medical 
staffs against liability if they stop treatment at a patient's request." Id. 
The Supreme Court of Canada recently struggled with the constitutionality 
of a statute criminalizing assisted suicide. A competent patient suffering from 
Lou Gehrig's disease asked for a judicial declaration that the statute was void as 
applied to her and her physician. The Court dismissed her petition, concluding 
that human life must be respected and that no societal consensus existed in favor 
of legalizing physician-assisted suicide. See MEISEL, supra note 137, § 18.22, at 505-
06. 
224. See Glantz, supra note 24, at 235. 
225. See id. ("[P]roving beyond a reasonable doubt [that terminally ill eld-
erly patients] died as victims of homicide, rather than from mftural causes, will 
often be difficult."). 
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B. The Criminal Law and Extreme Medical Negligence 
The involvement of the criminal law in cases where some ex-
treme form of professional negligence has caused death also ap-
pears to be highly unusua1.226 Doctors rarely have been charged 
criminally with conduct that must be evaluated by scrutinizing the 
standard of care used in treating patients. 227 Only one decision to 
withdraw treatinent from a terminally ill patient, the Barber case,228 
has resulted in the criminal prosecution of the treating physi-
cians.229 That prosecution ended, however, when the California 
Court of Appeals granted a writ of prohibition. 230 
More often, a prosecutor's decision to pursue a conviction has 
been based on conduct that does not involve evaluating the stan-
dard of care.231 Typically, the alleged wrongful actions fall into one 
of two categories: 1) conduct that would be criminal whether done 
by a doctor or anyone else - for example, sexually molesting pa-
tients,232 committing Medicaid fraud,233 or prescribing drugs for 
non therapeutic purposes;234 or 2) conduct that is so aggravated that 
expert testimony is scarcely needed to demonstrate the conduct's 
226. See id. at 231 (discussing judicial reluctance to interfere with physicians' 
practice of medicine). 
227. See id. at 236. 
228. See supra notes 160-71 and accompanying text. 
229. See Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 486 (Ct. App. 1983). 
In this case, two California physicians were charged with murder after assenting to 
the requests of a patient's family to withdraw all life support systems. See id.; see 
also Glantz, supra note 24, at 236. 
230. See Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486. 
231. See Glantz, supra note 24, at 231. 
232. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Helfant, 496 N.E.2d 433, 436 (Mass. 1986) 
(finding a physician guilty of rape after he drugged a patient in order to have 
sexual intercourse with her); Minnesota v. Poole, 489 N.W.2d 537,545 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1992) (stating that a physician is guilty of criminal sexual conduct if the "ac-
tor accomplishes the sexual [contact] by means of a false representation that the 
contact is for a bona fide medical purpose by a health care professional"). 
233. See, e.g., United States v. Khan, 53 F.3d 507,513-15 (2d Cir. 1995) (find-
ing several physicians and the clinic organizer guilty of participating in a racket-
eering enterprise designed to defraud the New York State Medicaid system); 
United States v. Laughlin, 26 F.3d 1523, 1526-27 (lOth Cir. 1994) (finding a phy-
sician guilty of Medicaid fraud). 
234. See, e.g., Williamson v. Board of Med. Quality Assurance, 266 Cal. Rptr. 
520, 522 (Ct. App. 1990) (revoking a physician's medical license after the physi-
cian had illegally prescribed drugs); Connecticut v. Levine, 551 A.2d 1271, 1276-
77 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989) (finding a physician guilty of illegally prescribing nar-
cotics and controlled substances); Ohio v. McGriff, 672 N.E.2d 1074, 1075 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1996) (finding a physician guilty of illegally prescribing stimulants). 
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gross departure from accepted medical practice. 235 
An example of the second type of conduct involved a prosecu-
tion for involuntary manslaughter in Pennsylvania.236 Ajury found 
a doctor criminally liable for the death of a seventeen-year-old pa-
tient who died of complications related to an overdose of the bar-
biturate Tuinal. 237 The doctor had written numerous prescriptions 
for controlled substances for the patient in the months preceding 
her death.238 In the seven weeks before her death, he had given the 
patient seven separate prescriptions for Tuinal, in double the nor-
mal strength.239 On one occasion, about a month before her death, 
the patient had arrived at a pharmacy in such a stuporous condi-
tion that she had to hold on to the cash register to maintain her 
balance.24{) When the pharmacist called the physician to express his 
reluctance to refill the prescription, the doctor told him to "fill the 
damn thing.,,241 The evidence detailed by the court's opinion so 
overwhelmingly demonstrated the defendant physician's gross irre-
sponsibility in prescribing the medication242 that one could con-
clude that expert testimony was unnecessary to support the jury's 
finding that the doctor "consciously disregarded a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk ... [involving] a gross deviation from the stan-
dard of conduct a reasonable person would have observed.,,243 
In another case involving conduct that grossly departed from 
accepted medical standards, Dr. Tony Protopappas, a California 
dentist, was convicted of second-degree murder for the deaths of 
three of his patients following anesthesia overdose. 244 Dr. Pro-
topappas caused the deaths of three young women within five 
months,245 two of them within four days of each other, by his stag-
gering disregard for the most basic principles of competent ad-
235. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Youngkin, 427 A.2d 1356, 1361 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1981) (involving a physician who "recklessly overprescribed [medication] to [a 
patient] over the course of several months"). 
236. See id. 
237. See id. at 1359. 
238. See id. at 1360-61. 
239. See id. 
240. See id. at 1361. 
241. Youngkin, 427 A.2d at 1361. 
242. See id. The court found relevant the facts that the patient was an outpa-
tient and Tuinal is rarely prescribed to outpatients, the strength of the prescrip-
tion, and the frequency of the prescription. See id. 
243. Id. 
244. See People v. Protopappas, 246 Cal. Rptr. 915, 916 (Ct. App. 1988). 
245. See id. at 926-27. 
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mInIstration of general anesthesia. 246 The court summarized the 
doctor's outrageous conduce47 and then stated: 
No reasonable person, much less a dentist trained in the 
use of anesthesia, could have failed to appreciate the 
grave risk of death posed by the procedures he utilized. It 
was not a question of whether a fatality would occur, only a 
question of when; and ultimately there were three of 
th 248 em. 
The conduct in each of the aforementioned cases clearly supported 
the jury's verdict. These actions are inapposite, however, to a phy-
sician's attempt to alleviate pain by prescribing high doses of mor-
phine to terminally ill patients. 
In another case involving extreme medical negligence, the 
physician was convicted of willfully violating New York's public 
health laws. 249 In 1990, Dr. Gerald Einaugler transferred his sev-
enty-eight-year-old patient from a hospital to a nursing home across 
the street.250 There, Dr. Einaugler mistook the patient's peritoneal-
dialysis catheter for a gastrostomy tube and directed the staff to 
feed her through it.251 When the mistake was discovered by a nurse, 
Dr. Einaugler was advised to "get the patient to a hospital. ,,252 He 
delayed the transfer for more than ten hours, despite his knowl-
edge that peritonitis would likely develop and could become fatal if 
untreated.253 Peritonitis did develop, and the patient died within 
days. 254 Dr. Einaugler was convicted of recklessly endangering his 
246. See id. at 927. 
247. See id. at 927-28. The court obselVed: 
Protopappas did not supply proper general anesthesia or tailor the dos-
age to the patient. Without the patient's authorization he substituted 
surrogate dentists who were neither licensed nor qualified to administer 
general anesthesia. He instructed them to give improperly preset dos-
ages for extended periods with little or no personal supeIVision and 
caused multiple patients to receive ever increasing amounts of general 
anesthesia at the same time, none of them enjoying his undivided atten-
tion. He was also habitually slow in reacting to the resulting overdoses; 
and in the case of Craven, simply abandoned her. 
Id. at 927. 
248. Id. at 928. 
249. See George J. Annas, Medicine, Death and the Criminal Law, 333 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 527, 528 (1995) (discussing the case of Dr. Gerald Einaugler). 
250. See People v. Einaugler, 618 N.Y.S.2d 414,415 (App. Div. 1994). 
251. See id. 
252. Id. 
253. See id. 
254. See id. 
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patient and of willfully violating New York's health laws. 255 On ap-
peal, the court found that his conduct fully supported the convic-
tion for reckless endangerment and was a "willful act of neglect," in 
violation of New York's public health laws.256 It found that the doc-
tor displayed a conscious disregard for the patient's safety by failing 
to transfer her to a hospital for treatment. 257 It was not Dr. 
Einaugler's misidentification of his patient's dialysis tube that ran 
afoul of the criminal law but, rather, his attempt to conceal that er-
ror by delaying her transfer to a hospital. 258 He was never charged 
criminally with the patient's death, however. 259 
In several recent cases, the criminal law again has been used to 
sanction physicians for the deaths of patients where the physician's 
conduct has been deemed particularly outrageous.260 In another 
New York case, Dr. David Benjamin was convicted of murder for 
knowingly and intentionally causing the death of a patient after 
performing a late-term abortion.261 The court found that Dr. Ben-
jamin knew he did not have the required skills, yet he performed 
the abortion in deliberate indifference to the health and safety of 
his patient, who died from excessive bleeding.262 At the time of the 
death, the state licensing authority had revoked the doctor's medi-
cal license temporarily for exhibiting gross incompetence and neg-
ligence while treating five other patients. 263 The state, however, 
permitted Dr. Benjamin to continue to practice pending final 
revocation of his license. 264 
In 1995, in Colorado, prosecutors charged Dr. Joseph J. Ver-
brugge, Jr., an anesthesiologist, with manslaughter after he fell 
asleep during ear surgery on an eight-year-old boy. 265 When the pa-
255. See id. at 414-15. 
256. Einaugler, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 415-16. 
257. See id. at 415. 
258. See id. at 415-16. "[T]his case does not support the proposition that 
medical professionals need fear the prospect of unwarranted criminal prosecu-
tions for honest errors of medical judgment." [d. at 416. 
259. See Annas, supra note 249, at 528 (hypothesizing that one reason for the 
district attorney's failure to prosecute was that he may not have believed that he 
could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the patient would have survived had 
she been transferred sooner). 
260. For a fuller discussion of these cases, see id. at 527. 
261. See Lynette Holloway, Abortion Doctor Guilty of Murder, N.V. TIMES, Aug. 
9,1995, at AI. 
262. See id. 
263. See id. 
264. See id. 
265. See Howard Pankratz, Manslaughter Charge Filed in Fatal Ear Surgery, 
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tient died, the Colorado Board of Medical Examiners found that 
the doctor's "actions fell 'grossly below accepted standards of 
medical practice' and 'likely resulted' in the boy's death.,,266 Be-
sides failing to monitor the boy during surgery and remaining 
awake, vigilant, and responsive to the developing crisis, Dr. Ver-
brugge also falsified the boy's medical chart.267 In April of 1995, 
when he was charged with manslaughter in connection with the 
boy's death, it was alleged that Dr. Verbrugge had fallen asleep 
during at least six other operations in the recent past.268 
In perhaps the most egregious case, Dr. Milos Klvana, a Cali-
fornia obstetrician, was convicted of nine counts of second-degree 
murder for nine deaths that took place over an eleven-year pe-
riod.269 The court found that he acted deliberately and with a con-
scious disregard for life.270 The opinion in this astonishing case re-
vealed the outrageousness of Dr. Klvana's conduct. 271 He 
repeatedly engaged in grossly incompetent and unsafe obstetrical 
practices, lost privileges at several hospitals, lied to patients and to 
the hospitals at which he sought privileges, disregarded numerous 
warnings from other doctors about his practice methods and his 
attitude, and asked his patients to suppress facts about their deliver-
ies and to lie to authorities.272 
These isolated and highly unusual cases involve conduct which 
can properly be called - at the very least - willful and wanton. In 
some, it was sufficiently aggravated to be found intentional.273 In a 
number of them, it seems the failure of the medical boards to in-
tervene decisively was an important factor in the involvement of the 
criminal law.274 Certainly, the physicians' acts far exceeded any-
thing that could be regarded as the exercise of good-faith medical 
DENVER POST, Apr. 6, 1995, at B1. 
266. Id. 
267. See id. 
268. See Annas, supra note 249, at 528. 
269. See People v. Klvana, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 512, 514-15 (Ct. App. 1992). 
270. See id. at 526. 
271. See id. at 527. 
272. Id. 
273. See Annas, supra note 249, at 529 (stating that criminal charges against 
physicians almost always involve extreme conduct that recklessly or intentionally 
deviates from the accepted standard of care). 
274. See id. ("In the rare cases of criminal prosecution, charges have usually 
been brought because a pattern of deaths and reckless disregard for patients' 
safety has emerged and, for some reason, the physician's license has not been re-
voked."). 
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. d 275 JU gment. 
C. Physicians' Good-Faith Treatment of Patients 
When physicians engage in good-faith efforts to treat patients, 
courts are extremely reluctant to try to regulate their conduct by 
means of the criminal law.276 Courts have recognized that man-
slaughter and murder statutes are inappropriate and ineffective as 
means of such control.277 In Commonwealth v. Edelin, a 1976 Massa-
chusetts case, a physician was tried for manslaughter after perform-
ing an abortion of an allegedly viable fetus. 278 The court reversed a 
jury conviction, pointing out that even if the doctor's judgment of 
nonviability had been wrong, "manslaughter could not be sup-
ported by proof merely of a mistake of judgment, even if that was 
the result of negligence or gross negligence.,,279 So long as the phy-
sician's judgment is made in good faith and is not "grievously unrea-
sonable by medical standards," the law will not interfere.28o As the 
majority opinion in Edelin stated: "A larger teaching of this case 
may be that, whereas a physician is accountable to the criminal law 
even when performing professional tasks, any assessment of his re-
sponsibility should pay due regard to the unavoidable difficulties 
and dubieties of many professional judgments. ,,281 
The President's Commission, in its 1983 report entitled Decid-
ing to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment, cogently articulated the rea-
sons for deferring to medical judgment, and the importance of it, 
especially in the administration of pain medication to the dying pa-
275. See id. (concluding that physicians' good-faith errors and inadvertent 
mistakes in the treatment of patients will not result in criminal liability) . 
276. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 486 (Ct. App. 
1983) ("[I]t appears to us that a murder prosecution is a poor way to design an 
ethical and moral code for doctors who are faced with decisions concerning the 
use of costly and extraordinary 'life support' equipment."). The Florida Supreme 
Court best summarized this reasoning when it stated: 
To be relieved of potential civil and criminal liability, guardians, con-
senting family members, physicians, hospitals, or their administrators 
need only act in good faith. For them to be held civilly or criminally li-
able, there must be a showing that their actions were not in good faith 
but were intended to harm the patient. 
John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984). 
277. See, e.g., Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486; Commonwealth v. Edelin, 359 
N.E.2d 4,12 (Mass. 1976). 
278. Edelin, 359 N.E.2d at 5. 
279. [d. at 13. 
280. [d. (emphasis added). 
28l. [d. at 18. 
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tient. The report stated: 
[AJlthough medication is commonly used to relieve the 
suffering of dying patients (even when it causes or risks 
causing death), physicians are not held to have violated 
the law. How can this failure to prosecute be ex-
plained ... ? 
The explanation lies in the importance of defining 
physicians' responsibilities regarding these choices and of 
developing an accepted and well-regulated social role that 
allows the choices to be made with due care. The search 
for medical treatments that will benefit a patient often in-
volves risk, sometimes great risk, for the patient: for ex-
ample, some surgery still carries a sizable risk of mortality, 
as does much of cancer therapy. Furthermore, seeking to 
cure disease and to prolong life is only a part of the physi-
cian's traditional role in caring for patients; another im-
portant part is to comfort patients and relieve their suffer-
ing. Sometimes these goals conflict, and a physician and 
patient (or patient's surrogate) have the authority to de-
cide which goal has priority.282 
363 
For these reasons, the courts properly hesitate before interfering 
with a physician's medical judgment, except in egregious cases. 
D. The Appropriate Role oj the Criminal Law in Medical Decisions 
Criminal prosecutions of physicians engaged in treating ter-
minally ill patients and making good-faith decisions about medica-
tion to control pain and suffering should rarely, if ever, be 
brought. Patients in these extreme circumstances require and are 
entitled to the fearless, aggressive efforts of their doctors to control 
their final pain and suffering. The intensity of these measures of-
ten can and should rival earlier efforts to keep the patient alive.283 
To allow a patient to experience unbearable pain or suffering is an 
unethical medical practice, and physicians should not allow exag-
gerated fears of legal action to deter them from providing dying 
patients with aggressive, intensive palliative care. Morphine and a 
few other drugs in the medical arsenal are the heaviest of artillery, 
282. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 180, at 78-79. 
283. See Wanzer, A Second Look, supra note 22, at 847. Dr. Wanzer and his 
colleagues remarked that" [t] 0 withhold any necessary measure of pain relief in a 
hopelessly ill person out of fear of depressing respiration or of possible legal re-
percussions is unjustifiable. Good medical practice is the best protection against 
legal liability. " Id. 
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used for the most urgent of reasons.284 Some risk will always be at-
tendant to their use.285 The dosage requirements for adequate pain 
relief and the susceptibility of individuals to dangerous side effects 
are highly variable factors which may make every administration of 
morphine hazardous.286 Nevertheless, morphine appropriately re-
mains the drug most often prescribed for the effective treatment of 
terminal pain and suffering,287 whether it be the pain of metastatic 
cancer,288 or the frightening, gasping suffocation that often follows 
withdrawal of a ventilator. 289 Morphine can keep most patients vir-
tually pain-free, anxiety-free, and often alert for long periods. 290 
How best, how much, and when to administer morphine are pecu-
liarly medical decisions, with which the criminal law should not in-
terfere, except in the most extraordinary of cases. 
In addition, it is important to contemplate the ramifications 
for other dying patients if physicians are made fearful of criminal 
liability when they seek to manage terminal pain and suffering ag-
gressively. For many people, the fear of pain and extreme anxiety 
regarding the ability of the medical profession to deal with it 
greatly exceed the fear of dying.291 Medicine knows how to control 
pain in most cases.292 Yet, when doctors become fearful of using 
the tools at their disposal, they become incapable of doing what 
they are able to do. Patients consequently suffer needlessly. 
Criminal prosecutions in cases like the Minnesota morphine inves-
tigations, even if unsuccessful, have the potential to cause enor-
mous damage, in exchange for little social value. The Minnesota 
cases were not about euthanasia, and they were not about culpable 
negligence. Such cases rarely are. The intervention of the crimi-
nallaw is not likely to deter or remedy either problem. 
During the investigation of the two Minnesota cases, it became 
apparent that there was inadequate documentation substantiating 
284. See Foley, Treatment of Cancer Pain, supra note 54, at 88. 
285. See id. at 88-89 (noting that the potential side effects and complications 
include addiction, excessive sedation, respiratory depression, nausea and vomit-
ing, constipation, overdose, and seizures). 
286. See id. 
287. See id. at 89. 
288. See Melzack, supra note 41, at 28. 
289. See Feldman, supra note 108, at 20. 
290. See Melzack, supra note 41, at 28-29. 
291. See id. at 27 (stating that pain can be worse than death itself and can 
erode the patient's will to live). 
292. See Buchan & Tolle, supra note 22, at 59. 
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the need for morphine at the levels given in both cases.293 It was 
also clear that most health care institutions had no procedures or 
guidelines to assist physicians in the appropriate use of large dos-
ages of pain-relieving medication.294 In an effort to give some clar-
ity to the issue and guidance to physicians, the Hennepin County 
Medical Society prepared a paper entitled "Position Paper on Man-
agement of Pain and Suffering in the Dying Patient.,,295 A wide 
consensus of the Minnesota medical community supported the pa-
296 per. 
Subsequently, the Hennepin County Attorney and the Henne-
pin County Medical Examiner jointly issued a statement calling on 
medical institutions to formulate guidelines for the administration 
of pain-relieving drugs.297 The statement strongly advised health 
care centers to examine and revise their own policies to reflect the 
concerns the morphine cases raised (particularly concerns about 
documentation), and to give better, more specific guidance to doc-
tors who must decide how to best dispense high dosages of narcot-
ics to dying patients.298 
Although the medical community initially did not react fa-
vorably to that joint report,299 considerable constructive dialogue 
followed between representatives of the Minnesota Medical Asso-
ciation and the Hennepin County Attorney and Medical Exam-
iner.30o A number of hospitals began to take steps to adopt proce-
dures to help ensure the delivery of well-documented, effective, 
and compassionate palliative care for hopelessly ill patients.30l In 
293. See Feldman, supra note 108, at 23-24 (stating that "[i]nadequate 
documentation appears to be at the heart of the matter in the two Hennepin 
County cases" and arguing that better documentation is needed in all medical re-
cords). 
294. See id. at 24. 
295. See J. Paul Carlson, Managing Pain and Suffering in the Dying Patient, 
MINN. MED.,June 1990, at 35,35. This paper has been reproduced in Appendix 
A of this Article. 
296. See id. (stating that the paper represents the "position of organized 
medicine on this subject"). 
297. See Feldman, supra note 108, at 20, 23-24. 
298. See id. at 23-24. 
299. See id. at 24 (noting that the medical community objected to the re-
port's recommendation that hospitals formulate guidelines "as an unwarranted 
intrusion into medical matters"). 
300. See id. at 20. 
301. SeeJohnson, supra note 24, at 29. Several hospitals instituted guidelines 
similar to those proposed by the county attorney and the medical examiner. Ac-
cording to Johnson, physicians at these facilities are less likely to be the subject of 
a criminal investigation and prosecution. See id. Johnson posits: 
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time, horror stories of end-stage cancer patients dying in excruciat-
ing pain have become less common. 
Other encouraging developments have occurred since the 
morphine investigations. In 1992, Minnesota amended its assisted 
suicide statute by adding a subdivision that describes acts or omis-
sions not considered aiding suicide.s02 It states: 
A health care provider ... who administers, prescribes, or 
dispenses medications or procedures to relieve another 
person's pain or discomfort, even if the medication or 
procedure may hasten or increase the risk of death, does 
not violate this section unless the medications or proce-
dures are knowingly administered, prescribed, or dis-
pensed to cause death.30s 
Other states have passed similar provisions, in an effort to assure 
doctors that criminal charges will not result from their appropriate 
and compassionate palliative care for dying patients.S04 
As noted earlier, hospice care is on the rise in the United 
S S05 M d' . b 'd c tho f S06 tates. e lcare now relm urses proVl ers Lor IS type 0 care. 
In 1996, the Health Care Financing Administration approved a 
new diagnosis code for palliative care, which should lead to the 
creation of a special diagnosis-related group to allow payment of 
palliative care expenses for hospitalized patients as they approach 
death.s07 In addition to the guidelines for the treatment of cancer 
pain to which this Article previously referred,sos at least forty-seven 
states have started cancer pain initiatives to increase awareness and 
knowledge about effective palliative care strategies. S09 
Id. 
Still, uncontrolled pain remains an important motivation be-
Compliance with the guidelines will be overwhelming evidence that the 
physician not only acted in good faith, but also that the administration of 
the pain-relieving drug was done in a manner consistent with prevailing 
medical standards. In such circumstances, there can be no criminal li-
ability. 
302. See MINN. STAT. § 609.215, subd. 3(a) (1996). 
303. Id. 
304. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-lO4 (Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 
35-42-1-2.5 (Michie Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-216 (Supp. 1996); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1116 (1993). 
305. See Cassel & Vladeck, supra note 39, at 1233. 
306. See id. at 1232. 
307. See id. at 1232 (noting that "only in 1996 are we beginning to acknowl-
edge that some of the care delivered in hospitals is palliative"). 
308. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. 
309. See Foley, Pain Relief, supra note 72, at 2149. 
HeinOnline -- 23 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 367 1997
1997] PAIN RELIEF FOR THE DYING 367 
hind many patients' desire for suicide.s10 In one survey, sixty-nine 
percent of cancer patients reported that they would consider 
committing suicide if their pain were not treated adequately.Sll 
More than half of all cancer patients experience severe pain,mand 
two-thirds of those with advanced disease report pain.SIS Yet studies 
indicate that as many as ninety-five percent of these patients can 
get good pain relief if skilled practitioners administer the right 
quantities of the right medications.314 
v. CONCLUSION 
The prospect of legal access to physician-assisted suicide raises 
deep and disturbing questions about our commitment to the com-
passionate care of the dying. Many articulate and persuasive chal-
lenges have been raised against physician-assisted suicide, by indi-
viduals and groups on all fronts, conservatives and liberals, 
believers and agnostics, physicians and philosophers. m 
310. See Kathleen M. Foley, Pain, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 4 
, PAIN F. 163, 175 (1995) [hereinafter Foley, Physician-Assisted Suicide]. 
311. See Foley, Misconceptions and Controversies, supra note 63, at 311. 
312. See John J. Bonica, Cancer Pain, in 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF PAIN 400, 402 
(2d ed. 1990); see also Council on Scientific Affairs, American Medical Association, 
Good Care of the Dying Patient, 275 JAMA 474 (1996) (reviewing AMA reports on 
the care of dying patients). 
313. See The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial to Improve 
Care for Seriously III Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand Prognoses and Prefer-
encesfor Outcomes and Risks of Treatments, 274JAMA 1591,1594 (1995). The study 
revealed that families of 50% of a sample of patients who died in the hospital be-
lieved that the patients "experienced moderate or severe pain at least half the 
time during their last [three] days of life." Id.; see also Foley, Treatment of Cancer 
Pain, supra note 54, at 84 (asserting that pain control should be sufficient to allow 
the patients with advanced disease to function at a level that they choose and to 
die relatively free of pain). 
314. See Foley, Controlling Pain, supra note 58, at 164; Cicely Saunders, Cur-
rent Views on Pain Relief and Terminal Care, in THE THERAPY OF PAIN 215, 218 (Mark 
Swerdlow ed., 1981). 
315. See Paul Wilkes, The Next Pro-Lifers, N.Y. TIMES, July 21,1996, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 22 (listing "agnostics and believers; those who support legalized abortion 
and those who oppose it, those who bow to God and those who exalt reason; AIDS 
activists and Orthodox rabbis, the American Medical Association and Pope John 
Paul 11"). See generally Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide - Even a Very Limited 
Form, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 735 (1995) (arguing adamantly against assisted 
suicide); DANIEL CALlAHAN, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF LIFE (1993) (proposing plau-
sible ways of bringing the legal and policy issues in the care of the dying and the 
critically ill back into closer contact with some of the oldest questions of human 
existence) . 
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Not only have the two decisions from the Second316 and the 
Ninth317 Circuits provoked widespread discussion and commentary, 
they have evoked anew the concerns that physicians and others 
have expressed for years: that there is no principled way to limit as-
sisted suicide to terminally ill, mentally competent patients who 
make rational requests for such aid; that assisted suicide will lead to 
euthanasia, and that both will be "practiced through the prism of 
social inequality and prejudice that characterizes the delivery of 
[health care] in all segments of society,,;318 that although there may 
be morally acceptable exceptional cases for assisted suicide, such 
cases cannot justifY such a dramatic change in public policy, with its 
enormous potential for abuse; that the relationship of doctors to 
their dying patients, already emotionally taxing and complicated, 
will be disastrously changed, with trust eroded;319 that elderly, poor, 
and disadvantaged patients will be subject to pressures they cannot 
withstand; that the many terminally ill patients who suffer from 
treatable depression will remain untreated, and "physician-assisted 
suicide [will] take the place of psychiatric intervention and care,,;320 
and finally, that we will no longer vigorously pursue means to make 
dying more comfortable, more peaceful, and more meaningful for 
the vast majority of dying patients who do not want suicide. 
Perhaps we need to be reminded again of the relationship our 
physicians traditionally have had with us and of the ancient Hippo-
cratic command known to all doctors, that" [t] 0 please no one will 
I prescribe a deadly drug, nor give advice which may cause his 
d th "321 ea . 
How then, ... do I respond to patients' requests for phy-
sician-assisted suicide? In the only way I can, by saying 
that I value their lives and their worth and therefore can-
not kill them. I tell them, too, that I will care for them 
and treat their symptoms, and, if their pain cannot be 
adequately controlled while they are dying, that I will 
honor their choice to be sedated. And, last, I assure them 
316. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.) , cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 
(1996). 
317. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.), cert. 
granted, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996). 
318. Kamisar, supra note 315, at 738. 
319. See Steven H. Miles, M.D., Physicians and Their Patients' Suicides, 271 
JAMA 1786,1786-87 (1994). 
320. Foley, Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra note 310, at 165. 
321. OXFORD MEDICAL COMPANION 371 Uohn Walton et al. eds., 1994). 
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that I will never abandon them but will remain to the end 
a witness to their dying.322 
APPENDICES 
369 
Mter the Minnesota morphine investigations, the Hennepin 
County Medical Society issued a position paper and the Hennepin 
County Attorney and Medical Examiner jointly issued guidelines 
on the management of pain in terminally ill patients. Both are re-
produced below. 
APPENDIX A 
HENNEPIN COUNIY MEDICAL SOCIE'IY POSITION PAPER ON 
MANAGEMENT OF PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THE DYING PATIENT
323 
Statement of Need 
Fear, misunderstanding, and misplaced concern can contrib-
ute to the pain and suffering of the dying patient. The patient's 
fear of pain may accentuate the pain or the suffering of both pa-
tient and family. Misunderstanding by health care professionals of 
ethical and legal principles can contribute to the problem. Physi-
cians and nurses may be concerned that administering large 
amounts of morphine, or other narcotics, to the dying patient may 
be viewed by others as euthanasia, an intentional act to cause death 
for reasons of compassion, rather than as an effort to control pain 
and suffering. This concern is misplaced. The administration of 
large quantities of narcotic analgesics is not euthanasia when the 
purpose is to alleviate pain and suffering, not to shorten the life of 
the patient. There are sufficient ethical, moral and medical rea-
sons to prescribe morphine, and other pain relieving medications, 
even at the risk of hastening the patient's death. 
Physicians, and other health care providers, have an obligation 
to provide maximal relief from pain and suffering for dying pa-
322. Kathleen M. Foley, Pain and America's Culture of Death, WILSON Q., 
Autumn 1994, at 20, 2l. 
323. Hennepin County Medical Society, Position Paper on Management of 
Pain and Suffering in the Dying Patient, in J. Paul Carlson, Managing Pain and Suf 
fering in the Dying Patient, MINN. MED.,June 1990, at 35,36-37. 
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tients. To fulfill this obligation, health care providers must under-
stand applicable ethical and legal principles, as well as current 
practices in pain management. They must also be attentive to the 
individual patient's response to narcotic and sedative drugs. 
Scope of Statement 
This statement applies only to the use of narcotics, and other 
analgesia, in the management of pain and suffering in dying pa-
tients, based on accepted medical, ethical, and legal principles and 
practices. Other institutional policies and guidelines address pain 
control for non-terminal patients, as well as termination of life-
sustaining treatment for dying persons, and specific treatment mo-
dalities such as cardiopulmonary resu!?citation, sustained assisted 
ventilation, etc. Other policies and guidelines address the deci-
sion-making process, including the role of advance directives. Phy-
sicians, and other health care professionals, should be knowledge-
able about all policies and guidelines that apply to the care of 
persons with terminal conditions. 
A dying patient is an individual with an incurable and irre-
versible condition that usually leads to death, unless life-sustaining 
treatment is instituted or continued. 
Principles for the Management of Pain and Suffering for Dying Patients 
Dying patients who possess the capacity for decision-making, 
or the appropriate surrogates of patients who do not have the ca-
pacity to make decisions, have the right to participate in decisions 
about the course of their own medical treatment, including the de-
gree of pain relief desired. Health care professionals should make 
every effort to relieve the suffering of the dying patient, even if this 
requires intermittent or continued administration of significantly 
larger doses of narcotics and sedation, which in circumstances 
other than anticipated death would be considered inappropriate. 
The goal of treatment is to relieve patient suffering to the fullest extent pos-
sible. For dying patients there is no "cap" dose; high doses may be 
required for relief of pain and suffering. 
The role of the physician in caring for the dying patient is to 
provide comfort and maintain dignity. Dying patients should be 
assured that maximal comfort will be provided even in the face of 
impending death, and even when the physical effects of narcotics, 
or other analgesics, such as falling blood pressure, declining rate of 
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respirations, or altered level of consciousness, are present. On the 
other hand, it is unacceptable for health care providers to adminis-
ter such drugs for the purpose of abetting the patient's suicide, or 
to deliberately cause the patient's death for reasons of compassion. 
In managing dying patients, health care professionals are not obli-
gated to do that which violates their conscience or professional 
judgment, but have the duty to arrange for alternative care under 
such circumstances. 
The principles stated herein reflect those stated in 1) The Hastings 
Center Report, Guidelines on the Termination of Life Sustaining 
Treatment and The Care of the Dying, 2) The University of California 
Los Angeles Medical Center Policy, Administration of Narcotics for Dy-
ing Patients, and 3) The Report of the President's Commission, Deciding 
to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment. The President's Commission re-
port references the ''principle of double effect, " as stated in the Declaration 
of Euthanasia, Vatican City, 1980. 
APPENDIxB 
JOINT GUIDELINES OF THE HENNEPIN COUNTY ATTORNEY AND 
HENNEPIN COUNTY MEDICAL EXAMINER FOR THE ADMINISTRATION 
OF PAIN-RELIEVING DRUGS
324 
1. Governing Principles 
A. The administration of large dosages of pain-relieving 
drugs to terminally ill patients is appropriate only as necessary for 
the relief of pain, discomfort or distress. 
B. Proper decision-making and proper administration in-
clude thorough documentation particularly of the need for the 
drug at the dosage level administered. 
C. Hospitals and other institutions should develop and adopt 
specific guidelines establishing the acceptable standard of medical 
practice for the treatment of terminally ill patients with large dos-
ages of pain-relieving drugs. 
D. Hospitals and other institutions caring for terminally ill pa-
324. Garry Peterson, M.D., Hennepin County Medical Examiner & Thomas 
L. Johnson, Hennepin County Attorney, Joint Guidelines of the Hennepin 
County Attorney and Hennepin County Medical Examiner for the Administration 
of Pain-Relieving Drugs (April 24, 1990) (on file with the Hennepin County At-
torney, Criminal Division). 
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tients should develop and adopt procedures to ensure doctors and 
other professionals under their authority follow their guidelines. 
E. Creation of and adherence to such guidelines should as-
sure patients of compassionate and effective treatment and should 
create community confidence in the actions of hospitals and health 
care professionals involved in the care of terminally ill patients. 
II. Policies and Procedures 
A. The specific policies and procedures adopted may vary 
from institution to institution. However, such guidelines should 
address at a minimum: 
1. Patient selection criteria; 
2. Obtainment of consent and notification of patients 
and/ or their families or legal representatives; 
3. Documentation of treatment decisions made, their 
underlying rationales and goals, the patient's symptoms 
and indications for such treatment decisions and the pa-
tient's responses to such treatment; 
4. Administration procedures to be followed, includ-
ing the content of the Physician's Order authorizing the 
drug; 
5. Responsibilities of and coordination of responsi-
bilities among physicians, nurses, and other health care 
professionals; 
6. A review process for the treatment given pursuant to 
the guidelines. (By way of analogy, blood transfusion re-
view and surgically removed tissue review are universally 
familiar facets of hospital quality assurance.) 
B. An example of existing guidelines that may serve as a basis 
for appropriate policies and procedures is the UCLA Medical Cen-
ter Policy No. 0024 dealing with the "Administration of Narcotics 
for the Dying Patient" (copy attached), a pioneering effort in creat-
ing a systematic and medically sound treatment approach to the dy-
ing patient. 
III. Effect of Guidelines 
The development of specific guidelines consistent with the 
above and adherence to such guidelines should obviate the need 
for involvement by the Hennepin County Medical Examiner and 
Hennepin County Attorney. In the event involvement is necessary, 
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the existence of such guidelines and adherence to them will be an 
important consideration in the review process. 
UCLA MEDICAL CENTER POLICY No. 0024. 
Subject: 
Administration of Narcotics for the Dying Patient. 
Purpose: 
To relieve maximally the pain and suffering of dying patients. 
Reference: 
Nursing Service Policy # 048, Medication Administration. 
Principles: 
1. Dying patients (or an appropriate surrogate) who possess 
decision-making capacity have the right to participate in decisions 
about the course of their own medical treatment, including the de-
gree of pain relief desired in the final stage oflife. 
2. Health care professionals must make every effort to re-
lieve the pain and suffering of the dying patient even if this re-
quires either intermittent or continued administration of signifi-
cantly larger doses of narcotics which in circumstances other than 
anticipated death would be considered inappropriate. The goal of 
treatment is to relieve pain and suffering to the fullest extent pos-
sible. 
3. Dying patients should be assured the maximal possible 
comfort even in the face of impending death as heralded by falling 
blood pressure, declining rate of respirations, or altered level of 
conSCIOusness. 
4. Health care professionals are not obliged to do that which 
violates their conscience or professional judgment, but have the 
duty to arrange for alternative care under such circumstances. 
Implementation: 
1. Establish that patient fits the selection criteria. 
2. Establish guidelines for ordering and administering the 
narcotic, and for documentation. 
Patient Selection Criteria 
A. Patient must have current Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) order. 
B. Patient must be dying and experiencing symptoms caus-
ing pain, discomfort, or distress for which narcotics are an ac-
cepted treatment. 
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Protocol for Ordering, Administering and Documenting 
A. Physician Responsibility 
1. The rationale and goals of narcotic therapy for the dying 
patient must be documented in the Progress Notes of the patient's 
medical record. A statement that the patient (or appropriate sur-
rogate) agrees with this therapy must be included as well. This 
note must be written by the attending physician, or by the house 
officer with the verbal concurrence of the attending or chief resi-
dent. The attending must concur with this note within 24 hours by 
signing the house officer's Progress Note. 
2. The Physician's Order must begin with the statement: 
''Administration of Narcotic for the Dying Patient." This order must be 
written by the attending physician, or by the house officer with the 
verbal concurrence of the attending or chief resident. The attend-
ing must concur with this note within 24 hours by signing the 
house officer's Physician's Order. 
3. The Physician's Order must specify: 
a. The amount of drug: the amount of diluent. 
b. The time interval and amount of drug in mgs/hour 
for incremental dose increase. 
c. That incremental dose increases are to be based on 
pain or symptom assessment and not vital sign pa-
rameters. 
d. A maximum or "cap" dose is not required. 
e. The conditions under which he/she wishes to be no-
tified. 
4. The narcotic order must be renewed every 72 hours. 
5. Telephone and/or verbal orders are not acceptable when 
initiating or changing the order. 
6. The physician should assess the efficacy of narcotic treat-
ment on a frequent basis. 
B. RN. Responsibility 
1. Only staff R.N.'s who have passed the V.C.L.A. Pharma-
cology exam may administer narcotics. 
2. If IV /SQ continuous infusion narcotics are ordered, they 
must always be administered via an infusion pump. The IV tubing 
proximal to the infusion device must be clearly identified signifying 
that this line is infusing a narcotic. 
3. Administrative Nurse (A.N.) II, III, IV, or V, or a unit 
based Clinical Nurse Specialist must co-sign the order. 
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4. The pharmacy is to be notified at least 30 minutes before 
the next bag of narcotic infusion is needed to allow for drug 
preparation. 
5. The R.N. administering the narcotic will: 
a. Increase the medication by the amount specified in 
mgs/hour within the given time increments should 
the patient continue to experience pain or other dis-
tressing symptoms. 
b. Assess the efficacy of treatment on a frequent basis 
and inform the physician when pain or other distress-
ing symptoms are not relieved. 
c. Alert the physician when the maximum dose of the 
narcotic has been given. 
d. Not discontinue the narcotic in the event the narcotic 
order is not renewed in 72 hours according to policy, 
but rather will notify the physician immediately so 
that a renewal order may be written at once. 
e. Discontinue the narcotic only upon the physician's 
order. 
f. Document the initiation or titration of the IV infu-
sion on the Continuous Narcotic Administration Re-
cord, on the Nurses Notes, and on the Controlled 
Substance Audit Sheet. 
6. Two nurses must co-sign any wastage of unused narcotic 
solution in the Controlled Substance Administration Record per 
Nursing Service Policy #050. Any narcotic being returned to 
Pharmacy must also be documented on this Record. 
7. Vital signs may be obtained to assess the patient's status in 
the dying process, but should not influence decisions about admin-
istering narcotics in the presence of continued pain or other dis-
tressing symptoms for which the narcotic is an accepted treatment. 
8. The following narcotics administered by continuous infu-
sion may include but are not limited to: 
a. Morphine Sulfate 
b. Hydromorphone (Dilaudid) 
c. Methadone 
d. Fentanyl 
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